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This thesis reviews the connection between the Korean defense industry and Korean
economic progress. The defense industry has both costs and benefits. Some argue that
the benefits outweigh the costs; others argue the reverse.
Because of the apparent diffusion of tension between South and North Korea, the
domestic pressures to reduce the national defense budget are growing stronger.
Consequently, some have questioned whether the Korean defense industry should be
maintained. In fact, the Korean defense industry has had both negative and positive
effects on economic growth since the early 1970s. It is time to analyze the Korean
defense industry and enter a new phase which considers both security and economic
implications. The Korean defense industry is still necessary for national security. It can
be more helpful for economic growth.
In order to improve the Korean defense industry's structure and organization, this
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Over the past decade, a growing number of developing countries have began to
pursue military industrialization focusing on conventional weapon systems. The Republic
of Korea (South Korea, hereafter ROK or Korea) played an important role in this new
wave. Though a late industrializer, Korea became the fifth largest conventional arms
exporter in the Third World (including China). The Korean defense industry, which
began to accomplish the important national goal of self-reliant defense in the early 1970s,
has contributed greatly to national security. The Korean defense industry has built a base
for highly precise weapons production and is being converted from a government-
controlled system to a civilian-operated system. It now produces an almost complete line
of conventional arms.
The tension between South Korea and North Korea appears to be diffusing. For
example, South and North Korea entered the United Nations on September 23, 1991,
North Korea announced that they will accept International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA's) nuclear inspections, and there has been a series of meetings between high
ranking government officials from South and North Korea. This suggests that a decrease
in defense spending is likely in Korea.
Some argue that the Korean economy would have developed much faster without
the burden of the defense spending. We could have invested more in the civilian sector
by reducing the defense budget. The question of large peacetime defense expenditures
raises the macroeconomic question of whether such expenditures have a positive or
negative effect on the Korean economy. This question is not purely academic and is
extremely difficult to answer. There are experts and data to support both arguments and
the answers seem highly dependent upon such factors as the overall national economic
conditions, the type of alternative expenditures or fiscal policies with which the military
spending is compared, the economic and social objectives of the policies, and the
structure of and conditions within the defense industry.
Korean defense expenditure is 27.6 percent of the national budget. Defense
investment is 35% of defense spending and 60% of defense investment is spent on the
defense industry. (See Table 1 and Figure 1.) We cannot deny that such a big investment
in the defense industry has a great influence on the national economy. Clearly, the
Korean defense industry is a significant factor in the Korean economy and in the nation's
strategic posture. In value, it provides more than one-tenth of the goods and services to
the Ministry of Defense per year. It employs between 20 and 30 percent of all Korean
scientists and engineers and between 10 and 20 percent of the manufacturing labor force.
Korea wants both "guns and butter."
However, defense industrialization has aroused sharp scholarly and policy debates
in Korea on the appropriateness and desirability of such a course of action. Those who
support defense industrialization argue that possession of a domestic arms-making
capability provides political autonomy, status, and security by reducing dependence on
dominant suppliers and minimizing uncertainties such as embargoes on external arms
supply. They further assert that its capital and technological spin-off effects through
heavy capital investment in modern industrial sectors and through the acquisition and
dissemination of advanced technology serve as engines of growth for the entire national
economy.
Table 1. The FY 1991 Defense Budget as a Proportion of the Government Budget
(in billions won)
1990 1991 Increase %
Government Budget 22,689 26,980 4,290 19.9
-Defense Budget 6,638 7,452 815 12.3
-Others 16,051 19,518 3,475 21.7
Proportion
of Defense Budget in
the Government Budget
29.3 27.6 2.7
*based on the Finalized Budget
Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1991
For those who are skeptical about military industrialization, developing a defense
industry is a costly and risky venture. Small market size, diseconomies of scale and
capital and technological intensiveness make it extremely costly for developing countries
to pursue defense industrialization. Export market uncertainty associated with the
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Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper
oligopolist structure of the global conventional-arms market further threatens the
survivability of the defense industry. Draining effects on the social welfare sector and
inflationary pressure on the economy are often cited as the likely results of defense
industrialization in developing countries. [Ref. l:p. 214]
The primary mission of the Korean defense industry is to provide for national self-
defense and contribute to national development. In this connection, this study focuses on
surveying the role of the Korean defense industry in national economic growth as well
as on examining the conversion from the military industry to the civilian industry in
Korea.
The intent of this study is to determine how much impact and influence the Korean
defense industry has had on national economic growth. This study will also suggest some
ideas for future development in the Korean defense industry.
B. METHODOLOGY
The basic methodology of this study is descriptive. This thesis will be based on a
study of real Korean defense industry data from the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis
(KIDA) and Korean economic statistics. The data is analyzed using the Feder and Ram
Model and Robert M. Solow model.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATION, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is to identify how the defense industry has influenced
economic growth in Korea since 1975. This thesis will develop and update previous
papers about the Korean defense industry.
A major problem in assessing the Korean defense industry's role in national
economic growth is the limited resources which describe this role. Furthermore, although
available, some classified materials and some sensitive political matters will not be
discussed. This thesis assumes that the two models used in this study can be applied to
analyze the impacts of the Korean defense industry on national economic growth.
D. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the thesis consists of five chapters.
Chapter n reviews the literature. This chapter presents the previous papers.
Chapter in describes the history of the Korean Defense industry.
Chapter IV suggests two models and identifies the factors of the Korean defense
industry influencing economic growth.
Chapter V suggests the desirable directions of the future Korean defense industry.
Chapter VI concludes this thesis.
n. LITERATURE REVIEW
Until recently, defense was one of the major components of government
expenditure. It was frequently ignored by economists and simply assumed to be
autonomous.
Economists can represent defense choices in series of diagrams. Figure 2 uses the
classic guns-versus-butter "trade-off" to link defense spending to investment and growth.
It provides a simple model for the belief that defense is a burden on the economy. If the
economy is operating on its production frontier, where its resources are fully and
efficiently employed, then more defense is purchased at the expense of civil goods and
services (quadrant I, Figure 2). If investment depends on the level of civil spending, then
more defense expenditure means reduced investment. This has an adverse effect on the
economy's growth rate (quadrants n and HI of Figure 2). However, increased defense
spending is likely to produce benefits to society in the form of greater protection and
security for its citizens, as shown in quadrant IV of Figure 2. [Ref. 2:p. 12-
13]
Estimates of the impact of defense expenditure on growth naturally differ. The
results will depend on the specification of the model, which transmission mechanisms
(input-output model, dynamic model, ridge regression model and so on) are allowed for;
the type of data, time-series or cross-section; the assumptions about certeris paribus




















As defense spending rises from Dl to D2,
civil expenditure falls from CI to CO, hence
investment declines from II to 10 and the
growth rate falls fron gl to gO. At the same
time, at D2 there is more protection; for
simplicity, growth and protection are shown
on the same axis.
conditions, such as how other policies adjust in response to the changes in military
expenditure; and the estimation method and sample adopted. The range of estimates can
be illustrated with a personal selection. Dunne and Smith (1984) calculate the effect of
reduced military expenditure in the UK economy using a simulation of a large economic
model. Their results suggest that, after allowing for all the feedbacks, a reduction of the
share of defense expenditure in GDP by 1 .5 percent would increase GDP by 0.5 percent,
assuming that total pubbc expenditure was kept constant. [Ref. 3:p. 85]
The productivity of resources employed in the defense sector may not be the same
as productivity in the civilian sector. The defense sector is a relatively less competitive
part of economy. However, in Korea the largest part of defense expenditure is
procurement of weapons, ammunition, and military logistics supplies. These items come
from a defense industry controlled by the Korean government. As a result, the Korean
defense industry may have contributed to national economic development.
Therefore, the Korean defense industry may have greatly influenced various aspects
of the national economy. Until now, only a few studies have reviewed relations between
defense spending, gross national product and technological advance. Dr. Sung G. Min
analyzed defense R&D and its impacts on technological advance from 1979 to 1985. Dr.
Ja Song studied the impacts of the defense industry on the civilian sectors in Korea based
on 1987 data. Dr. Dong J. Hwang studied the future of the Korean defense industry. But
none of these authors studied the defense industry as a whole.
Dr. Min analyzed defense R&D and technological advance using R. M. Solow's
model (1957). According to his study, Korean defense technology has improved by about
240 percent since 1975. This resulted from defense R&D investment. He concluded that
the technology improved as defense R&D investment increased.
Dr. Song studied how the Korean defense industry influenced the civilian sector.
His methodology was descriptive and based on statistics. He categorized effects into three
areas: contributions to GNP growth, creation of employment opportunities and spill-over
effects of military technology to the civilian sector. According to his paper, defense
industry output accounted for 1.52 percent of GNP in 1987 and 1.68 percent of total
employment, but the pervasive effect of technology was weak.
Dr. Hwang summarized and analyzed the Korean defense industry development and
suggested the desirable direction of the future Korean defense industry.
This thesis addresses the overall economic aspects of the Korean defense industry.
10
HI. HISTORY OF KOREAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
A. WHAT IS THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY?
The defense industry is defined as the industry that researches, develops and
produces material and weapons for national security. [Ref. 4:p. 155-162] As
defined here, the defense industry has different characteristics from the civilian industry.
In particular, the defense industry is a national industry. To develop the nation
politically, economically and socially, it is required to ensure stable national security. To
consolidate the national defense, we should maintain the existing military strength as well
as reinforce the military power against the changing external environment. Based on the
above reason, the defense industry is said to be a national industry.
Second, the government is the only demander for defense industry products. These
products are manufactured on the contract ad libitum between government and industry.
The relationship between the government and the defense industry is not a normal
market. Table 2 presents a long list of the "imperfections and failures" of the defense \//
industry in relation to traditional free market theory. This table gives over thirty
important assumptions of free market economic theory that are violated by what actually
takes place in the defense market. [Ref. 5: p. 29-30] The defense market also differs
significantly from traditional oligopoly and monopoly markets in which the buyer and
seller are still essentially in an adversarial bargaining position. In the defense market, the
11
buyer and seller have a far greater mutuality of interest: performance and accuracy of
defense products and their timely supply. Price plays a relatively minor role.
Table 2. Some examples of "Market Imperfection and Failures" in Defense
Free-Market Theory Defense Market
Many small buyers.
Many small suppliers.
All items small, perfectly divisible,
in large quantities
Market sets prices.
Free movement in and out of market.
Prices set by marginal costs.
Prices set by marginal utility.
Prices fall with reduced demand.
Supply adjusts to demand.
Labor highly mobile.
Decreasing or constant returns to scale.
Market shifts rapidly to changes in supply
and demand.
Market smoothly reaches equilibrium.
One buyer (Ministry of National
Defense).
Very few, large suppliers of a given
item.
One ship built every few years, for and
hundreds of millions of dollars each.
Monopoly or oligopoly pricing-or "buy
in" to "available" dollars.
Extensive barriers to entry and exit.
Prices proportional to total costs.
Any price paid for the desired military
performance.
Prices rise with reduced demand.
Large excess capacity.
Greatly diminishing labor mobility.
Increasing returns to scale in region of
interest.
7-10 years to develop a new system,
then 3-5 years to produce it.
Erratic behavior from year to year.
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Table 2, continued.
Profits equalized across the economy.
Perfect mobility of capital (money).
Mobility of capital to changing demand.
No government involvement.
Selection based on price.
Prices fixed by market.
All products of a given type are the same.
Competition is for share of market.
Production is for inventory.
Size of market established by the buyers
and sellers.
Demand sensitive to price.
Equal technology throughout industry.
Benefits of the purchase go to the buyer.
Buyer has the choice of spending now or
saving for a later purchase.
Wide and consistent profit variations
between sectors; even wider between
firms.
Heavy debt, difficulty in borrowing.
Large and old capital equipment "locks
in" companies.
Government is regulator, specifier,
banker, judge of claims, etc.
Selection often based on politics, sole
source, or "negotiation"; only 8% of
dollars awarded on price competition.
Most business with any risk is for "cost
plus fee."
Essentially, each producer's products are
different.
Competition is frequently for all or none
of a given market.
Production occurs after sale is made.
Size of market established by "third
party" (Congress) through annual
budget.
Demand "threaf'-sensitive, or responds








Relatively stable, multiyear commitments. Annual commitments, with frequent
changes.
Third, highly precise technology and highly skilled technical manpower are
required to produce defense industry products. Fourth, while it takes a long time to
prepare for military production and to return the investment on capital, new technology
soon becomes outdated because weapon systems change rapidly. Not only are defense
choices complex, but they have to be made in a world of uncertainty. No one can predict
the future accurately: today's threat might be tomorrow's ally; today's technology
equipment might be tomorrow's dreadnoughts. [Ref. 2:p. 26] Finally, defense industry
activities have the secrecy inherent in military technology, so they should be kept secret.
[Ref. 6:p. 16]
There is still a question of why Third World countries should develop and improve
their own defense industry. Third world countries seek to produce their own weapons for
a combination of political, military, and economic reasons. A domestic weapons
production capacity can be seen as an expression of national sovereignty, tangible
evidence that a country intends to defend its independence. It is also believed to
demonstrate that a country controls its own affairs and, because arms industries use some
of the most sophisticated technology available, that the country is well along the path to
modernization. In addition, a domestic weapon industry can ensure vital supplies of arms
and ammunition in time of war, thereby reducing a country's dependence on foreign
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supplies; it can enable a country to obtain weapons that it would otherwise have trouble
procuring abroad; and it can be a useful element in promoting the foreign policy of the
state.
Third world countries that set up domestic arms production facilities often have at
least two economic objectives: to spur their industrialization program and to reduce the
financial costs, particularly outlays of foreign exchange associated with weapons
procurement. The creation of a military industry is said to promote the industrialization
process by upgrading both technology and manpower and making economies of scale
possible in certain supply industries.
The expectation that foreign exchange can be saved by producing weapons
domestically is based on the belief that the cost of importing licenses, know-how, raw
materials and components will be less than the purchase price of a complete weapon.
Some saving might also occur because the cost of labor in Third world countries, even
skilled labor and technical manpower, tends to be considerably less than in the
industrialized countries. [Ref. 7:p. 175].
The development of a nation's defense industry is always important. First, a
defense dependent upon imported weapons will likely lead to political subordination to
the exporting nation. In addition, advanced nations are increasingly unwilling to transfer
their military technology, and thus they strengthen their control over sales. To cope
actively with the increasing technology protectionism of advanced nations and the rapid
15
development of military technology, our local defense industry should be nurtured. [Ref.
8:p. 163]
B. KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Since the Korean War, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces' structure and
operational and tactical concepts were developed according to United States military
doctrines. Most weapons systems and logistic support to Korea has depended on the
United States. Until the late 1960s, most weapons and equipment of ROK Armed Forces
were provided by the U.S Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding. At that time, the
Korean economic, industrial and technological level were too low for domestic weapons
production. As can be seen from Table 3, this represents more than 27% of all U.S.
military aid given to East Asia and the Pacific during this period, and over 30% in the
period before Vietnam started to absorb increasing amounts of U.S. assistance.
The decision to move toward defense industrialization was largely motivated by the
quest for increased military self-reliance to cope with the eroding security environment.
Since the division of the Korean peninsula following World War n, there has been
constant military tension between South and North. North Korea has traditionally
maintained a military edge over the South, whose relative weakness has been offset by
the U.S security commitment. In fact, the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has
served as a crucial deterrent force. In the late 1960s, however, North Korea began to
step up its military hostility through a series of bold provocations. On January 21, 1968,
North Korea commandos raided the Blue House, the South Korean presidential residence.
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Table 3. U.S. Military Assistance to East Asia and the Republic of
Korea (1949-1968)
(millions of dollars)








1949-1952 11.7 160.7 7.2
1953-1957 527.8 2,403.7 21.9
1958 331.1 627.8 52.7
1959 190.5 606.7 31.4
1960 190.2 501.6 37.9
1961 192.2 495.4 38.8
1962 136.9 523.3 26.2
1963 182.5 651.8 28.0
1964 124.3 563.7 22.1
1965 173.1* 648.9 26.7
1966 153.1* 535.6 28.6
1967 149.8* 673.0 22.3
1968 197.4* 1,026.9 19.2
Total 1953-1961 1,431.8 4,635.2 30.9
Total 1949-1968 2,560.6 9,419.1 27.2
*Excludes military assistance funding related to South Korean forces in
Vietnam.
Source: SIPRI. The Arms Trade with the Third World (London: Paul Elek
Limimted. 1971); pp 146- 147.
Two days later, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and its eighty-two crew members.
A year later North Korea shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane with thirty-one
crew members. These incidents led South Korea leaders to perceive a dangerous
vulnerability in its security in the event of an all-out attack by the North.
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This perceived threat did not by itself drive Korean leaders to search for self-
reliance in defense matters. The translation of this threat perception into actual decisions
to pursue military self-sufficiency through defense industry build-up was a result of the
rapidly weakening U.S. security commitment. Contrary to the Korean government's
anticipation of tough retaliatory measures to the above incidents, the United States
response consisted of mere verbal denunciations. This posture, conditioned no doubt by
U.S. entanglement in an unpopular and unwinnable war in Vietnam, disappointed and
worried the South Korean government. But the major shock was yet to come - the July
1969 declaration of the Nixon Doctrine ("Asian hands must shape the Asian future") with
which the Nixon administration began to disengage from the Far East. Shaped by
domestic budget politics, the doctrine provided, among other things, for the withdrawal
of an entire combat division from Korea by March 21, 1971 (the Seventh Division, with
a force of 24,000). This reduction in forces caused the government in Seoul to panic.
Both the government and the people began to doubt the dependability of the U.S.
commitment. The doubt grew stronger after the United States abandoned Vietnam in
1975. It was especially pronounced following Carter's announced intention to withdraw
U.S. ground troops from Korea in 1977.
This diminishing U.S. commitment in the face of heightened North Korean military
hostility pushed the South Korean government to opt for a policy of domestic military
industrialization. The security motive coincided with a set of opportunities then available.
Defense industries differ sharply from other industrial sectors in that they require a
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synchronized combination of defense technology, heavy capital investment, industrial
infrastructure and qualified labor. These prerequisites were available in Korea at the time
of the decision to move toward defense industrialization.
National development plans in Korea have emphasized the military industry since
the early 1970s. Prior to that time, Korea had more than one government arsenal
producing ammunition and small arms. However, the defense industry as a whole did not
command top priority until after the announcement of U.S troop withdrawals in
connection with the 1969 Nixon Doctrine. In the early 1970s, worldwide tension and
internal crisis on the Korean peninsula provided the incentives for the Korean government
to develop the Korean defense industry and self-defense capabilities. President Park
Chung Hee set up the ROK Armed Forces Improvement Plan to accomplish this national
goal as soon an possible. In response to the Korean Improvement Plan, during the annual
US-Korea Security Consultative Meeting in 1973, the United States formally pledged to
assist Korea in developing its munitions industry. This was to be part of the
compensation for reducing the US military presence. [Ref. 9:p. 62]
The Carter Administration's policies gave Korea incentives to promote the growth
of an independent production capability. The Carter Administration's troop-withdrawal
plan, later canceled, served as a major impetus for President Park Chung Hee's
administration to accelerate investment in heavy industries (chemicals, metals, and
machinery). This investment was to provide the infrastructure needed for a larger
defense-industrial program. At the same time, the Carter administration provided a series
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of coproduction agreements as a palliative for the U.S withdrawal policy. These were
designed to bolster Korean weapon production capabilities. They exceeded in quality and
sophistication those offered during the Nixon administration. [Ref. 9:p. 63]
To balance potential losses resulting from the troop pullout, the United States
committed a substantial amount of military aid. Although it was far short of Korean
requests, the aid eased the burden on the defense budget and improved Korean force
levels. More importantly, the United States provided Korea with a wide range of defense-
related technology by means of technical data packages, manufacturing license
agreements and coproduction in the framework of security technical assistance. The
availability of defense technology through United States security assistance was one of
the key factors enabling the Korean defense industry buildup.
The Korean defense industry began in the early 1970s but it could not succeed
without the economic growth and improvements in the industrial base experienced since
the late 1960s (See Table 4). The growth of the Korean economy since independence and
after the vast destruction caused by the Korean War is among the most remarkable
instances of national economic developmental success in the contemporary world. Void
of natural resources, Korea has created an economy, if not yet a political system, vibrant
with internal hope~an example to which other nations now aspire. From the dark nadir
of 1953, progress of this magnitude was virtually unthinkable; few foreigners realized
Korea's potential. [Ref. 10:p. 122]
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Table 4. Basic Economic Data, 1953-91
1953 1960 1970 1980 1982 1991
Land area (sq. 1cm.) 98431 98431 98447 98969 99022 99239
Population (thousands) 21502 24954 31435 38124 40578 43520
Percentage distribution of labor forces:
• Agriculture






















Percentage shares of GNP (at 1980
prices)
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GNP at current prices (million $) 1353 1948 7534 61203 81073 280/
800
Per capita GNP ($) 67 78 240 1605 1998 6498
Gross domestic fixed capital formation
(current prices) (%)
7.2 10.8 34.4 31.3 30.0 39.3
Gross domestic savings (%) 8.8 0.8 17.3 21.9 27.4 36.1
Foreign savings (%) 6.6 8.6 9.3 9.4 2.3 2.0
Ratio of exports/GNP 3.2 4.1 16.0 40.2 41.5 24.8
Ratio of imports/GNP 9.8 12.7 25.3 50.4 43.8 22.4
GNP growth rate 3.7 8.5 8.1 4.6 8.4
(1953-60) (1960-70) (1970-80) (1980-84)
= not available.
Source: Bank of Korea, National income in Korea 1982; Economic Planning Board
(EPB), Major Statistics ofthe Korean Economy, 1985; Hangook Daily Newspaper (April
2, 1992).
There were valid reasons for pessimism. The Republic of Korea suffered perhaps
a million casualties and damage estimated at more than $2 billion during the Korean
War. Per capita income for 1953 was $67, lower than before the war and one of the
lowest in the world, as shown in Table 5. Some 40 percent of all structures in the nation
had been destroyed or damaged, as was two-thirds of Korea's industry. Agricultural
production was 27 percent below that of prewar years.
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Today Korea has been described as "economic miracle" or model of new
industrialized countries. Per capita GNP had grown to $5,659 in 1990. Exports, which
have led the ROK's economic growth, rose from $50 million in 1962 to $46 billion in
1987.
Before reviewing the dynamics of the Korean economic performance, it is desirable
to consider the stages of its development since the Korean War. The economic
development of the Repubbc of Korea following the Korean War may be classified,
somewhat arbitrarily, by political eras. Critical economic policies received different
emphases under each administration. Thus, this discussion is divided into three parts:
import substitution and foreign-aid maximization under the First and Second Republics;
export-led growth under the Third and Fourth Republics; and unstable growth and second
take-off under the Fifth and Sixth Republics. [Ref. ll:p. 125]
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Table 5. Per capita and Total GNP, 1953-1990
(current dollars)


















(Per capita income is estimated to have been about $50 in 1948.)
Source: Economic Planning Board, various publications.
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1. Post-War Reconstruction and Stabilization (1953-1961)
The First Republic era was marked by a poor record of growth, a virtual
absence of economic planning and an intense effort to manipulate the foreign aid program
on which Korea relied. At that time, the government necessarily emphasized the
reconstruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities that had been destroyed during the
Korean War. The more urgent programs for reconstruction of industrial plants and
infrastructure were completed around the middle of 1957 and the government gradually
shifted its policy emphasis from reconstruction to price stabilization.
Both the reconstruction and stabilization programs during the post-Korean
War period were largely financed and supported by United States and United Nations
assistance. Beginning in 1953, a large amount of aid-financed imports arrived for relief
and reconstruction. During 1953-1960, total assistance provided by the United Nations
Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) amounted to approximately $120 million and
official United States assistance reached approximately $1,745 million. Over 70 percent
of Korea's imports were financed by foreign grants during this period. Foreign assistance
was important for the reconstruction programs, not only because it provided necessary
imports, but also because the "counterpart funds" generated by the sales of grant-aid
dollars provided a non-inflationary source of domestic-currency financing for investment.
During 1954-1960, almost half of the total general government expenditures were
financed by counterpart funds.
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Despite the volume of aid which the Republic of Korea received, it was not
all utilized effectively. A very high portion of aid came in the form of either non-
essential consumer goods or agricultural surplus items (which depressed domestic
agriculture) rather than as capital which would be used to redevelop the country. [Ref.
10:p. 9]
In addition, rapid inflation continued during the immediate post-war period.
Although the annual rate of inflation, measured by the wholesale price index, declined
from a peak of 531 percent for 1951 to about 25-28 percent in 1953-1954, it rose to 82
percent in 1955. The rate of inflation for 1956 was about 31 percent. In order to cope
with domestic inflation, the government and the United States aid mission to Korea
agreed to implement a financial stabilization program beginning in the second half of
1957. This stabilization was able to reduce the annual rate of growth in the money supply
to about 20 percent in 1957, from 62 percent in 1955 and 29 percent in 1956. Despite
some relaxation in the control of the money supply during 1958, relative price stability
was attained in 1958 and 1959, helped greatly by consecutive bumper crops in 1957 and
1958 which sharply reduced grain prices. The political and social instability caused by
the Student Revolution in 1960, however, brought a return to inflation. [Ref. 12:p. 41-
42]
The period of the Second Republic (1960-1961) was an economic limbo. The
political and social instability after the Student Revolution disrupted the economy and
effectively prevented anything more than regime maintenance. There were no changes
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in economic planning or progress of a magnitude reflecting the political revolution that
had occurred. [Ref. 10:p. 128] During this period, Korea depended heavily on the United
States, both economically and militarily.
2. Export-led rapid growth under the Third and Fourth Republics (1961-
1979)
"Increase production and export" and "Build the nation on exports" were the
national slogans of the Third and Fourth Republics. The military group which was to rule
the Republic of Korea for next 17 years was determined to achieve economic
development and energetically set about creating a climate in which economic growth
became a primary national goal.
Since the beginning of the 1960s, Korea has been experiencing remarkable
changes: from a unilateral relationship to bilateral economic cooperation, from grant-in-
aid to development loans and foreign direct investment, from a dependent to a self-
sustaining economy and from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries. Someday
Korea will become a "developed" nation.
For the first time in her history, Korea launched a Five-Year Economic Plan
in 1962. The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was geared to attain an annual
growth rate of 7.1 percent during the period 1962-1966. The basic goal was to create the
economic base for industrialization and self-sustaining growth. [Ref. 13:p. 9] In view
of the poor growth performance of the previous years, the plan's growth target seemed
too ambitious, particularly for the first year of the plan. But the target was exceeded by
the high growth rate that began in 1963 and has continued ever since. Following the
26
success of the First Five-Year Plan, Second, Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans were
formulated and implemented by the government. [Ref. 12:p. 44]
During the second half of the current century, the term "economic miracle"
began to appear in economic literature to describe Germany and Japan. Now Korea has
been added to the honor roll. In the past decades, Korea has managed extraordinary and
spectacular economic performance despite considerable odds. Yet the actual economic
growth surpassed the ambitious planners' expectations and surprised the rest of the
world. Many of the third world nations would like to "emulate South Korea's 20-year
leap from poverty to relative prosperity."
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as Figure 3 shows, the average rate of
growth was more than 10 percent a year, and per capita income increased from $87 in
1962 to $1,324 in 1979. With manufacturing the fastest growing sector and agriculture
the slowest, the structural transformation was dramatic. Agriculture's contribution to
GNP dropped from 38.7 percent to 18 percent between 1961 and 1981. In the same time
period, manufacturing's contribution rose from 13.5 to 29.5 percent. [Ref. 10:p. 25]
The most remarkable growth occurred in international trade: exports rose from a mere
$41 million in 1961 to $21.2 billion in 1981. This is an average growth of 37.1 percent
a year for the last two decades. In 1977, Korea celebrated breaking the $10 billion export
target and has doubled the total within four years.
During the First Five-Year Plan (1962-66), exports increased at an annual
rate of 38.6 percent while GNP grew 7.8 percent per annum (See Table 6). During the
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Figure 3. Korean Annual Growth of GNP, 1954 - 81
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second period (1966-71), the growth in exports slowed slightly to 33.8 percent per year
while GNP growth accelerated to 9.7 percent per year. During the third period (1972-
76), both exports and GNP continued to grow rapidly: the former at a 32.7 percent
annual rate and the latter at 10.1 percent. This was accomplished in spite of the energy
crisis.
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GNP Growth 7.8 9.7 10.1 5.6 5.4
Agriculture, forestry,
fisheries
5.6 1.5 6.1 -0.7 (a) 4.5
Manufacturing 15.0 21.8 18.7 9.4 11.2














(a) Largely a result of the failure of the rice crop in 1980.
Source: Derived from World Bank data.
The World Bank has observed Korea's trade from a different angle, i.e.,
efficient export growth can attain efficient import substitution. During the early stage of
industrialization, Korea emphasized selective import substitution which brought favorable
results. Her approach was to produce for both domestic and international markets. This
caused an increase in export-led growth and also an expansion of the domestic market.
Clearly, the process illustrates complementarities between the two. [Ref.
14:p. 439] At the same time, Korean trade policy indicates that there is a positive
correlation between exports and GNP. Based on comparative advantage, better utilization
of productive capacity and improvements in technology which create economies of scale,
a nation reaps the gains from foreign trade. Of course, the Korean experience
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presupposes a favorable international milieu and prosperous economic conditions in
industrial market economies.
Although it is essentially correct to characterize the Park's period as one of
export promotion, there is no absolute dualism inherent in the dichotomy between export
promotion and import substitution. At the same time that exports were an obsession,
major efforts were directed at import substitution for two products—arms and rice (rice
production will not be discussed in this thesis). Following the formulation of the Nixon
Doctrine, which called for the withdrawal of U.S troops from Korea and the shock of
improved U.S relations with the People's Republic of China in 1972, the Korean
government felt that it could no longer rely completely on the United States supply of
defense armaments. [Ref. ll:p. 136]
The Government concern was reflected in a new strategy putting great
emphasis on building up a new generation of Korean industries. In the mid-1970s, under
President Park's personal direction, the state began to commit extensive funds to develop
the heavy, chemical, and defense industries. [Ref. 10:p. 13] This was an epoch-making
event in the process of industrialization in Korea. Korea began to shift its development
sequencing from labor-intensive light manufacturing sectors to capital-intensive heavy
chemical industrial sectors with the initiation of the Third Five-Year Plan( 1972-76).
During the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81), active industrial deepening took
place in various sectors in the anticipation of high forward linkage effects with the
defense industry. The Korean defense industry accelerated industrial diversification.
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During this period, heavy machinery, iron and steel, shipbuilding, metallurgy, and
electronic industries were made strategic sectors for defense industry development and
massive investments poured into them. As Table 7 indicates, almost 80 percent of
investment in manufacturing during 1977-79 went to heavy industry. While investment
in light industry was severely depressed, that in basic metals (an essential to the defense
industry) exceeded its planned target by 30 percent three years before completion of the
plan. In the case of machinery, electronics, and ships (other sectors essential to defense
industrialization), 72 percent of the planned investment was used up within two years.
To finance these defense-related heavy industries, a National Investment Fund was
created. This fund absorbed public employee pensions and a fixed portion of all bank
deposits. In addition, a wide range of policy and administrative incentives was offered.
[Ref. l:p. 250]











2,893 588 1,024 1,194 2,806 87%
Basic Material 731 263 357 331 951 130
MES* 1,145 139 309 379 827 72
Chemicals and
others
1,107 186 358 484 1,028 93
Light Industry 1,621 193 252 304 749 46
Textiles 900 152 140 155 447 50
Others 721 41 112 149 302 42
Total 4,514 718 1,276 1,498 3,555 79
Source: World Bank, Korea: Current Developments & Policy Issues, 1980.
MES*: machinery, electronics, and ships.
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The Korean defense industry was first incorporated into the overall defense
policy. This policy fell into three distinct phase: The Force Modernization Plan (1971-
75), the Force Improvement Plan (1976-80), and the Second Force Improvement Plan
(1982-86). At the time the new defense industry was established, the crux of defense
policy consisted of the rapid improvement of domestic defense forces to prepare for a
possible power imbalance after the planned U.S. troop withdrawal. Although the relative
weight of the defense industry was still minor, the Force Modernization Plan paid serious
attention to the defense-industrial sector. As shown in Table 8, the Korean government
began to allocate investments into defense-related research and development for the first
time in 1971 (0.2 percent of total military expenditure, or 341 million won). Since then,
there has been an incremental increase in resource allocation to the R&D sector (a 1.6
percent average annual increase during 1976-80, for example). The most important event
during the Force Modernization Plan was the creation of the Agency for Defense
Development (ADD) in 1970. The ADD was commissioned to serve as a defense-related
technical data center and to assist the private sector's defense-related R&D. It also
acquired foreign defense technology and engaged directly in defense product
development. Since then, the ADD has played an important role in determining the
growth rate and direction of the Korean defense industry. In the early stages of
development, the Korean defense industry relied on the U.S technical assistance
agreements and data package and reverse engineering to produce simple munitions and
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communications equipment. This helped offset the lack of technology and engineers with
sufficiently specialized skills. [Ref. 2:p. 290]
Table 8. South Korean Military Expenditures by Appropriation Category, 1961-1981
(current million won)



















































































































Source: Kyung Heon Lee, National Defense and National Budget, in Chong Ki Park and
Kyu Uk Lee (eds.). National Budget and Policy Objectives (Korea Development Institute,
1982), pp. 168-69.
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While the Force Modernization Plan paved the way for the basic
infrastructure, it was the subsequent Force Improvement Plan that was responsible for
a big spurt in the Korean defense industry. In fact, the Force Modernization Plan fell
short of its planned objectives because of several factors: delayed and shrinking U.S.
military aid, the oil crisis, economic recession, and administrative inefficiencies. Acutely
sensing this trend, President Park gave orders to step up defense industrialization to the
self-supporting level. This soon resulted in an impressive array of financial,
administrative, and policy support measures expediting defense industrialization during
this period. (See Table 8)
More importantly, it is during this period that the Korean government
cultivated a defense-industrial complex. The defense industry was perceived as a losing
proposition due to small market size and diseconomoies of scale. Thus, most private
firms were reluctant to became involved in defense-industrial production. In order to co-
opt them as agents of defense industrialization, the Korean government provided them
with immense corporate-level incentives within the legal framework of the newly created
"Special Law for the Promotion of Defense Supply." These incentives included:
congressional financing to defense contractors four points below market rates; special
provisions for excise and value-added tax credits; advance payment for up to 90 percent
of sales contracts; exemption from import tariffs; concession of plant sites; and finally
the military draft exemption for skilled employees in the defense industry. Perhaps most
attractive to the defense contractors was the virtual government guarantee of corporate
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survival through procurement pledges and the promise to extend rescue efforts to defense
contractors operating in the red. These policy incentives produced a rapid growth of
defense contractors (ninety-one firms as of 1981) which was in turn responsible for the
acceleration of defense industrialization.
The Korean government financed massive resource needs in the defense
sector by enacting the National Defense Tax, which imposed a 10-percent income and
sales tax surcharge. Moreover, a nation-wide fund raising campaign was launched to
meet financial needs for special defense projects. Funds raised through this campaign,
which went into an account called "YulKok," were instrumental in funneling additional
financial resources into the defense industry, particularly the R&D sector.
The concerted efforts to integrate economic policy into defense policy in lieu
of defense industrialization were successful. The result was increased diversity and
volume in conventional weapons production. This impressive performance was a function
of the relative insulation of the defense industry sector from conflicting political
pressures. It received top priority in resource allocation and was exempted from
bureaucratic tribulations. Furthermore, government authorities prohibited any public
debate on the validity of the rate and direction of defense industrialization for national
security reasons.
The insulation of defense industrialization from competing political claims
was a result of a highly centralized decision-making system. While other economic
policies were subject to pluralist debates among technocrats, business-people, and
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scholars, policies related to the defense industry (including heavy industry) were confined
to the hands of only three persons during the Force Improvement Plan period (1976-79).
These three people were President Park, Won Chul Oh (then economic secretary to the
president in charge of heavy and defense industry) and Mun Taik Shim (then director of
the ADD). All decisions on the defense industry were made by these three. Once
decisions were made, they were implemented quickly. In fact, it was this highly
centralized decision-making structure that was responsible for the rapid implementation
of the defense industrialization plan. As shall be discussed, such a concentration of
decision-making power and the hasty implementation of the plan resulted in inefficiency,
duplication, and surplus capacity in the defense industry.
In the middle of the second decade of intensive military production, Korea's
new entrepreneurs are feeling the effects of an overcrowded market. In the absence of
effective government planning and coordination, companies compete viciously for larger
shares of the military procurement market. Although competition was apparently desired
by the Park administration, the result has been redundancy and excess capacity as firms
have attempted to became proficient in the production of all the components related to
their sector. This in turn has denied Korea the higher quality and economies of scales
that come with specialization. [Ref. 15 :p. 220]
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3. Unstable growth and second take-off under the Fifth and Sixth Republics
(1980-present)
Political and social uncertainty after Park's assassination in 1979 was
exacerbated by economic trauma. Not only was there an urgent need for structural
adjustment in the economy because of heavy industry policies, but agriculture was in
disarray because of rice failures. In 1980, for the first time since the Korean War, there
was economic decline. GNP dropped by 5.2 percent. [Ref. 10:p. 138] Exports recovered
in 1980, but were insufficient to rescue growth. Exports grew at a slightly slower pace
in 1981.
The Korean defense industry critically undermined macroeconomic
performance during the later part of the 1970s. Hasty emphasis on the defense industry
resulted in massive investment in the heavy and chemical industries during 1976-79. This
investment exceeded the levels dictated by market size, financing capacity, and even
technical and engineering capability. This investment pattern contributed to waste and
inefficiencies, and more importantly to the artificially overheated economy. As evidence
that the economy was overheated, the inflation rate leapt from the average annual rate
of 19.5 percent experienced between 1970 and 1978 to over 35 percent in 1979 and
1980. Of course, there were a number of other factors responsible for spiraling inflation
and the economic collapse in 1979 and 1980: the second oil crisis, foreign-exchange
shortage, supply bottlenecks and real estate speculation. However, the defense-motivated
massive investment in the heavy-chemical industries appeared to be a crucial variable
leading to the economic crisis of the late 1970s.
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Because of these circumstances, a radical reappraisal of the economic
management policies used in the 1960s and 1970s was undertaken in 1980. The
government adapted a strategy which would put tighter reins on the money supply - it
was believed that this would keep inflation under control. The Fifth Plan, which came
into effect in 1982, was devoted to reducing government involvement in the economy.
This created the conditions for a "second take-off into high and stable growth rates.
Since 1983, high growth and low inflation (around 3 percent) have been achieved. [Ref.
10:p. 14]
In the 1980s, the government policies toward the defense industry also
changed. During the Fifth Republic, the authority and responsibility for weapons system
development and the defense industry were shifted from the President to both the
Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Thus, military
R&D and defense industry did not command as high a priority and did not obtain as large
a budget.
There is some evidence that the government of President Chun Doo Hwan
tried to introduce changes in arms production. For example, the role of technicians and
planners within the government has been strengthened through the creation of new
agency called the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). Patterned after the US
Institute of Defense Analysis, KIDA employs most of the talented systems analysts who
were formerly at ADD and enjoys direct lines of communication with the higher echelons
of the Ministry of National Defense. [Ref. 15 :p. 221]
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In addition, the Korean defense industry, which was in an infant stage in the
early 1970s, is now able to domestically produce all basic arms and equipment. Thus,
it has already satisfied the needs of the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, the defense
industry was kept as status quo. The decreasing demands for weapons and equipment
discouraged the defense industry from committing to new investment.
Apart from the macroeconomic effects discussed, defense industrialization has
also produced a variety of microeconomic effects. As mentioned earlier, Korean firms
were initially reluctant to venture into the defense industry because of market uncertainty
and heavy capital investment needs. But the carrot-and stick policy of the government
gave them few alternatives. Ranging from big business conglomerates to small
businesses, over ninety firms engaged in military production. Of course, their risks were
tentatively cushioned by subsides, long-term low interest congressional fmancing and
guaranteed procurement. However, limits to subsidized military industrialization began
to surface. As Korea achieved self-sufficiency in conventional weapons needs in the early
1980s, the domestic defense contract market began to shrink. Defense production
capacity became underutilized. For example, the utilization rate of defense-industrial
plants hovered below the 50-percent level in 1984. Moreover, nine defense contractors
went bankrupt during the period 1980-84. [Ref. 2:p. 254]
In 1990, Korean defense industries are classified by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry and other related research agencies to avoid waste. Because
defense firms were not specialized and serialized based on technology and capabilities,
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they overlapped industrial sectors. This created conflicts. Critical and strategic materials
for military purposes are also designated by the Ministry of Defense to guarantee their
purchase, improve their quality, better manage these materials and revitalize research and
development. By the end of 1990, critical and strategic materials include 262 items. 82
defense firms are designated to produce these materials effectively and efficiently. Table
9 presents the defense materials and defense industry status by function. [Ref. 16:p.
260]
In summary, Table 10 provides an overview of the Korean defense industry.
Table 11 shows the principal producers in the Korean defense industry.
Table 9. Defense Materials and Defense Industry Status
Total Fire" Aero" Veh c Vessa Ammoe Comm 1 Others
Defense
Materials
262 40 9 16 16 85 46 50
Defense
Firms
82 11 4 10 10 8 9 34
Source: ROK MND, Defense White Paper, 1991
a includes gunnery
b means areospace and guided missiles
c means all transportations
d means all kinds of warship
e includes ammunition and mines
f means communications and electronics
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Table 10. Korean Defense Industry Progress
Period Objectives Policy Contents
1st phase • Establish • Formation of Agency for Defense
1970-1976 cornerstone for Development (ADD)
defense industry. • Begin research and develop for basic
• Home arms. (Introcution of U.S. technical data
production of packages.)
basic arms. • Cultivate the reverse-planning
capability.
• Installation of the bureau of defense
industry in MoD.
• Legislation of special laws related to
defense industry.
• Designation of defense industry and
military materials.
2nd phase • Accomplish • Formation of fund for improving
1977-1981 the cornerstone defense industry.
for basic • Build up mass production systems of
weapons basic arms.
production. • Begin to research and develop highly
• Begin to precise weapons.
produce precise
weapons.
3rd phase • Construct • Reorganiztion of weapons system
1982-1986 cornerstone for acquisition structure.
(Fifth Republic) highly precise • Localization of raw material.
weapons • Cultivate design capability for weapon
production. system.
3rd phase • Formation of • Guide pre-planned production of
1987-now production defense material.
(Sixth Republic) systems of • Specilization of defense industry.
defense material. • Increase the ratio of localization.
Source: MND, Defense White Paper, 1989.
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Table 11. Korean Defense Industry: Principal Producers
Producer Products
Dae-Dong Insustrial Jeep, trucks; APC assembly
Daewoo Heavy Industries Upgrading of APCs: ordnance
E-HWA Electric Mfg Ammuniction; mortars, multiple rocket
launchers; electronics; engines
Gold Star Missiles; electronics
Hyundai Shipping and Heavy
Industries Warships
KIA Industrial Jeeps; APCs; trucks
Kangwon Industries Tank conversion
Korea Heavy Industry Construction Tank parts
(KHIC)
Korea Heavy Machinery Industry Larger ordnance
(KOHEMA)
Korea Integrated Steel Preproducts
Korea Explosives Explosives; propellants; bombs
Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Warships
Korea-Tacoma Marine Industries Warships
Korean Air Lines Aircraft
National Plastic Mines
Oriental Precision Ordanance; electronics
Poongsan Metal Mfg (PMC) Ammunition; small arms
Samsung Precision Industries Aircraft engines
Sam Yang Chemical Chemicals
Tainan Electronic Wire Optronics; electronics
Tong-Il Industry Guns, grenade launchers
Tong Myung Heavy Industries Preproducts
Source: SIPRI
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C. LOCALIZATION OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT
1. Research and Development
In the initial stage, the research and development efforts emphasized
production imitation in order to speedily produce basic military equipment. By the end
of the 1970s, the ROK accumulated sufficient technologies to develop guided weapons
and various other sophisticated military systems. More recently, Korea has emphasized
the development of its own weapon systems and the improvement of quality.
However, advanced nations are unwilling to transfer their technology and the
ROK lacks expertise in advanced technology and basic applied science. Thus, it has not
been easy for the ROK to independently research and develop highly-sophisticated
weapons. To secure the science and technology needed for developing the next-generation
weapon systems in an independent, timely and economical manner, the ROK has
concentrated on basic preliminary studies. A "national defense science and technology
information center" is now being established to collect advanced technology from home
and abroad. Efforts have been made to streamline cooperative research and development
systems between the ADD and the defense industries to insure utilization of technology
on the basis of comparative advantage. To stimulate defense research, R&D investment
will be increased from 1.5 percent of the defense budget in 1988 to 5 percent in 2000.
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2. Aerospace and Guided Missiles
One important factor in developing the Korean aerospace industry was the
1979 agreement for Korea to co-produce the F-5 fighter. A program for F-5E/F models
was initially approved under the Carter administration. However, it may phase into
production of the newer and more capable F-5G, according to the plan proposed to the
Korean government by the Northrop Corporation (Figure 4). Koreans had originally
sought coproduction rights for the F-16, but this was turned down by the Carter
administration. Having decided to co-produced the F-5s, however, Korea also received
approval from the Regan administration to acquire 36 F-16s. The original contract was
to co-produce 68 F-5E/F aircraft (36 F-5Es and 32 F-5Fs). This was estimated to cost
$62 million. This program includes full logistical support, training, technical assistance,
and tooling for production.
The first major program of Korea's aircraft industry, apart from the
construction of four simple trainers in the early 1970s, was the coproduction of 500 MD
helicopters in 1976. The original agreement provided for 75 light combat helicopters
(equipped with 2.75 inch rockets and machine guns) to be assembled from kits produced
by Hughes Aircraft. Assembly of the 75 helicopters was completed in March 1979. It
was then reported that another 48 would be built at a facility in Kimhae. The program
did produce certain technological spin-offs to the civilian sector. At least six civilian
versions of the helicopter were delivered to local companies like the Korea Tacoma







































In September 1982, the ROK Air Force launched an aircraft development
project and became the third nation to produce airplanes in Asia. It has produced 500MD
helicopters and has locally assembled and co-produced the F-5E/Fs (called Jegongho in
Korean).
The Korean Fighter Program (KFP) is one of the Force Improvement Plans
to upgrade the quality of Korea's aircraft to enable all-weather operation and secure
command of the air in any emergency. To counter the sophisticated MiG-29s and SU-25s
that North Korea received from the Soviet Union, the ROK Air Force introduced the
advanced F-16s for high performance, multi-purpose operational fulfillment. The most
recent contract for F-16 Falcon coproduction was signed in March, 1991. The F-16
fighter was selected to replace the F-5G (the current major Korean fighter). According
to the ROK Ministry of National Defense, 120 F-16 Falcons will be introduced and
coproduced with General Dynamics Company. Among them, 12 F- 16s will be introduced
as an end item, 36 F-16s will be produced under licensed production by the prime
contractor, Sam-Sung Aerospace Company, and the remaining F-16s will be coproduced.
This program will increase the deterrence against North Korea for national security as
well as develop the domestic aerospace industry by means of military technical spillovers
and coproduction. [Ref. 15:p. 210]
Equally important, at least under the Park administration, was the
development of an indigenous capability for missile design and production. Development
of this capability began in 1972 with a MAAG-supervised maintenance facility for the
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Hawk and Nike Hercules missile systems. At the time, the U.S government recognized
that locating such a facility in Korea could save several million dollars over the life cycle
of these missiles, given lower labor costs, reduced transportation costs and utilization of
local repair parts. This program led to a commercial maintenance facility in Korea, under
the aegis of a local firm, Gold Star Precision Industries, Ltd. Korean personnel have
received training from the US military and, among others, from the Raytheon
Corporation. Based on this training, Korea has continued making improvements in this
commercial facility.
Domestic missile R&D and production were undertaken within the Agency
for Defense Development, at least until quite recently. President Park staked his personal
prestige on the development of missile production capabilities, with special emphasis on
the development of a long-range SSM capable of reaching Pyong-yang.
South Korea tested its first SSM successfully in 1978. The missile is believed
to have a range of 100-160 km. The SSM is designated NH-K. It is a modification of the
US Nike Hercules, although it is presented domestically as having been made with
entirely indigenous components. A military display in mid- 1979 revealed three Korean-
developed missile systems, although it is not possible to determine the extent to which
these relied on US technical data.
ADD gained experience in missile technology in part through a program for
maintaining the US Nike Hercules system. Under the agreement, the United States
provided technical specifications for upgrading reliability through electronics
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improvements, improving conventional warheads and adding a capability for use in a
surface-to-surface mode. The latter may have resulted in considerable augmentation of
the missile's range, although this has not been verified. In principle, the new guidance
systems should increase range. In any event, one analyst has suggested that this system
could be turned fairly easily into "a fine tactical nuclear weapon. " In addition to the NH-
K, Korea has had a program to modernize the Honest John missile by improving the
guidance systems to increase its accuracy.
3. Naval Production
The purpose of naval production in Korea is to prevent North Korean
insurgent operations on the South Korean coast. As a result, the country has concentrated
on the production of high-speed patrol boats for guarding shallow inshore waters. In
1972, Korea built its first successful naval vessels—fast patrol craft—under US
supervision. In 1979-80, the US and Korea jointly produced four multimission patrol
ships armed with Harpoon missiles. Four more were ordered in 1982. To counter North
Korean submarines (now 24 submarines), the ROK launched an anti-submarine warfare
development project in 1976 and produced the first Korean-design frigate in 1980. The
successful development of the frigate has contributed greatly to strengthening the ROK's
anti-submarine warfare capability and its maritime forces. Various landing craft have also
been produced, including four capable of carrying tanks. [Ref. 9:p. 161]
Eleven corvettes are currently under construction. These are equipped with
a Dutch weapon-control system, US-Italian gas turbines and West German diesel engines.
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Armed with one 76 mm and two 30 mm guns, the corvettes may be fitted with electronic
warfare equipment if testing proves successful. A prototype submarine was developed in
the late 1970s. However, Korea will not have the technical ability to manufacture a
modern submarine for some time to come. The South Koreans have also built a guided-
missile frigate, but do not seem to have the capability to build larger naval craft. Korea's
major naval producer is Hyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries, which has a massive
shipyard in the southern part of the country near Ulsan. Another firm, Korea Tacoma
Marine Industries, built the patrol boats controversially exported to Indonesia. Although
the country has the capability to produce basic naval craft, major weaknesses include
engines, naval armaments and components such as fire control systems. These must be
imported.
4. Ground Forces
Most Korean design and production programs are concentrated on ground-
force equipment, ranging from simple munitions to armored personal carriers (APC),
tanks and fairly sophisticated ordnance. About half of Korean defense needs are met by
domestic production; the great majority of this intended for ground forces.
One major program is standardizing the M-48 tank to the M-48A5
configuration. The US army has deployed this configuration in Korea. This package
includes a 105 mm gun, a standardized engine, fire -control equipment and night-vision
devices. Korea has wanted to produce a tank domestically since the mid-1970s. In 1976,
extensive discussions were held between the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
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US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to consider options for improving
Korean armored forces. Korea pressed for acquisition of the M-60A1 tank, but was
denied. For the M-48 project, granted in its place, South Korea reportedly produced up
to 30 percent of the conversion components.
Korea's ambition in the tank field came a step closer to fulfillment under a
recent agreement with General Dynamics to produce "several hundred" main battle tanks.
Designated ROKIT, for Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank, the new tank carries a 105
mm gun. It is reported to be either an upgraded M-60, similar to that which Korea
sought unsuccessfully in the late 1970s, or an "austere version" of the Ml Abrams.
Prototype testing began in April 1984. In 1985, the ROK finally succeeded in producing
a tank of its own design. Dubbed the "88 tank," it is now mass-produced and deployed
for combat. [Ref. 8:p. 160]
Another upgrade program to improve the Korea's Second Division fleet of
M-113 APCs is being undertaken by Daewoo Heavy Industries at Inchon. In the future,
Daewoo is to be responsible for performing routine depot and maintenance work for all
army tracked vehicles. Thus, vehicles will not have to be sent to the United States for
overhaul. Korea has also received assistance from Italy in this area. An agreement for
coassembly of the Fiat 6614A four-wheeled APC was signed in 1976.
South Korea also produces military trucks. KIA Industries (a merger company
that includes the former Asia Motor Corporation) was designated the major contractor
for all wheeled military vehicles produced domestically. One program calls for the
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insertion of a Korean-made four-cylinder engine in military jeeps while larger trucks are
being retrofitted with a Korean-produced German diesel engine. A quarter-ton truck of
KIA design was under development in 1978 and plans called for the design and
production of a two-and-a-half ton truck by the end of 1982. Korea also has a contract
with American Motors General Products for the assembly of a five-ton truck (M-809
series) using the Korean-produced diesel engine.
Korea produces a full range of ordnance, artillery and ammunition, as well
as propellants and explosives (Table 12). Prototypes for the 105 mm and 155 mm
howitzers were manufactured in Korea from US technical data packages (TDPs) as early
as 1973 and 1974, respectively. ADD simply copied the TDPs and redrew the designs
to Korean specifications without US assistance. Then they were provided to Korean
firms. As defects increasingly surfaced in the manufacture of these weapons in the mid-
1970s, the Koreans requested further technical assistance. This was provided by
personnel from American arsenals. The quality of small-caliber weapons and ammunition
in Korea is reputed to be very good, while weapons of larger caliber and components are
approaching military-grade quality. The improvements have much to do with
improvements in training, although shortages of both skilled inspectors and modern
testing equipment are still in evidence today.
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Table 12. Ammunition and Ordnance Production in Korea
Item Comment
M-16 rifle (5.56mm) Produced under liscence with Colt
Industries and the U.S. government
M-14 rifle (7.62mm) Estimated 100,000 produced by 1982
M-60 machine gun (7.62mm) U.S. design
155mm howitzer U.S. design
105mm howitzer U.S. desing
8-inch self-propelled howitzer U.S. design
81mm mortar Permitted for export by U.S.
60mm mortar No longer produced
4.2-inch mortar U.S. design
106mm recoiless rifle Permitted for export by U.S.
90mm recoiless rifle U.S. design
Vulcan anti-aircraft gun U.S. design
Oerlikon anti-aircraft Swiss co-production; exports have to be
sold through the Swiss who take 50%
of sale revenues
M-19 anti-tank mine U.S. design
M-18 anti-personnel mine U.S. design
M-72 rocket launcher U.S. design
M-203 rifle grenade U.S. design
90mm armor-piercing projectile U.S. design
Source: Defense Market Survey, Inc., DMS Market Intelligence Report for China
(Taiwan) and South Korea (Greenwich, CT: Defense Market Survey, Inc., 1981)
The munitions sector in Korea is suffering most acutely from excess capacity
because it has satisfied needs of Ministry of National Defense. The Poong-San Metal
Manufacturing Company (PMC), the major ammunition and ordnance producer in Korea,
is 90 percent idle in some areas.
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The electronics industry in Korea advanced in recent years, especially in the
area of data processing, communications and computers. Electronics are a major focus
of the most recent five-year development plan. The government has developed a state-run
organization, the Fine Instruments Center, to oversee advances in electronics, machinery
and related industries. This is a major area targeted for expansion, in part through the
initiation of research institutes with special emphasis on industrial electronics, including
semi-conductors and communications equipment.
53
IV. KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACTS
A. CONTRIBUTION TO GNP GROWTH
Economic growth is defined as the rate of change in GNP. [Ref. 17:p. 465] This
thesis will determine how much the Korean defense industry has contributed to the
growth in GNP. This thesis will use the Feder and Ram Model (see Appendix A). The
data used is from the "Economic Statistic Yearbook," issued by Bank of Korea, and the
KIDA Report (Korean Institute for Defense Analysis). Finally, the regression equation
is estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.
The final equation of the Model can be written as follows:
Q = o(^) + P(I) + [^ + CJ[5A]
In this equation, an overlined variable denotes a rate of growth and I/Q and D/Q
are the conventional notations for the ratios of investment and defense spending to total
output, respectively. Q is real gross national product (GNP). / is real gross fixed
investment. / includes only private investment spending data. Public investment spending
was not available in the National Income accounts. Gross rather than net investment is
used. Deducting capital consumption allowances, which are poor estimates of
depreciation, would make net investment an empirically erroneous measure.
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L is civilian employment. This of course does not mean that L only includes the
employment associated with the production of civilian goods and services. Since, as
noted in Appendix A, a large portion of defense supplies and equipment is produced by
civilian firms, "civilian employment" includes both civilian and military production.
The OLS results are reported below with the absolute value of the t-statistics in
parentheses.
Q = 17.060 - 0.323 (-) + 1.601 (Z) - 0.053 [D(-)]
Q Q
(1.18) (2.84) (2.13)
Period: 1975-1990 R2 =0.4338 DW = 2.225
The coefficient estimate for the employment growth effect has the theoretically
expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the usual levels of significance.
On the other hand, the sign of the investment coefficient of the opposite of the
theoretically expected result. However, this coefficient is not significant at the usual
levels of significance. Therefore, the negative relationship between investment and GNP
growth may be ignored.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate for the defense spending growth effect
variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the usual levels of
significance. If CD > and/or 5 > 0, increased military spending will imply a higher
rate of growth of total output Q (the defense plus civilian sectors) for a given usage of
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labor and capital. The negative sign of defense spending growth variable reflects that
either the defense sector generates negative externalities for the civilian sector or that
productivity in the defense sector is lower than in the civilian sector.
Unfortunately, this model does not separate defense spending into consumption and
investment areas. A large portion of defense budget was spent for investment on defense
industry and military R&D, as mentioned earlier.
To determine how much the defense industry has contributed to GNP growth, the
proportion of defense industry output in the GNP can be the defined as the proxy for
economic contribution of the Korean defense industry. Table 13 presents the ratio of
defense industry purchases to GNP. As shown in Table 13, the ratio of defense industry
purchases to GNP has increased since 1975, despite fluctuations from year to year.
The defense industry has contributed about 1 percent to GNP growth. Table 14
shows domestic purchases by function. For convenience, the defense industry is
categorized into seven sectors by function. As shown in Table 14, until 1978,
ammunition is the number one item for defense purchases. Since 1979, vehicles are the
largest part of defense product purchase. This means that the defense industry is oriented
toward import substitution for conventional arms and ammunition and focuses on
maintaining the military balance between South and North Korea. Therefore, vehicle,
ammunition and firepower occupy the 66 percent of total purchase of defense products.
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Table 13. The ratio of Defense Products Purchase to GNP
(In Billions Won = Current price)




1975 10,135.8 16.8 0.17
1976 13,912.7 44.2 0.32
1977 17,806.6 57.6 0.33
1978 24,001.6 139.3 0.58
1979 30,801.8 203.3 0.67
1980 36,749.7 327.7 0.89
1981 45,528.1 441.3 0.97
1982 52,182.3 466.0 0.90
1983 61,722.3 638.1 1.04
1984 70,083.9 602.8 0.86
1985 78,088.4 739.4 0.95
1986 90,598.7 1,053.2 1.17
1987 106,024.4 1,123.2 1.06
1988 126,230.5 1,384.1 1.10
1989 141,794.4 1,343.1 0.95
Source: KIDA, Analysis on Defense R&D and Defense Industry in Korea, 1990.
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Table 14. Domestic Purchase of Defense Products by Function (In millions won)
Year Fire Ammo Veh Comm Vess Aero Others Total
1975 6598 2 3167 4116 2642 16525
1976 10 14995 199 8436 14810 574 4327 43372
1977 2979 16494 4190 8536 9732 5072 7357 54180
1978 6641 34817 27176 10566 4462 28508 10410 122610
1979 10574 41686 65789 1746 6793 21874 12019 180697
1980 24770 51901 95524 27759 18544 34804 18442 271744
1981 26205 85788 115743 52749 14092 32210 19748 346535
1982 26037 80095 120258 56116 21794 45027 16501 365828
1983 28967 102002 109439 54060 36000 76321 23216 430005
1984 91173 129178 118942 39205 49332 74318 35678 537826
1985 149479 12744 184775 37972 44410 83197 37374 664651
1986 206943 208716 337715 58668 52271 77760 42741 984814
1987 193652 250619 305240 62896 63105 81939 62823 1020174
1988 225162 238313 288096 63645 208921 166789 74239 1265465
1989 227690 271475 299119 58727 166291 117246 95887 1236435
Total 1224682 1660121 2072207 559784 714673 845659 450266 7527392
Ratio 16.3 22.1 27.5 7.4 9.5 11.2 6.0 100.0
Source: KIDA, Analysis on Defense R&D and Defense Industry in Korea, 1990
B. INDUSTRIAL DIVERSD7ICATION
Defense industrialization cannot be effectively implemented without appropriate
forward and backward linkages with other industrial sectors. A push effect of defense
industrialization on industrial capability cannot be discounted despite some crucial
negative consequences. Through the 1979s, Korea was losing its competitive advantage
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in conventional export items from the light manufacturing sectors. Wage increases,
severe horizontal competition among developing countries and mounting protectionist
trends among OECD countries were rapidly depriving Korea of its comparative
advantage. The high uncertainty regarding investment in capital-intensive heavy industrial
sectors and the structural rigidity of the Korean economy as a whole prevented the
private sector from actively adjusting to changing market realities. The Korean
government's commitment to pursue defense industrialization at any expense and the
resulting incentives reduced such uncertainty and facilitated Korean firms' industrial
adjustment.
The immediate consequences of this industrial adjustment turned out to be
disastrous. From the long-term perspective, however, expediting heavy industrialization
via the defense-industrial impetus can be considered a constructive move. Indeed, if
national security concerns had not dictated defense industrialization, the Korean
government would not have invested over $10 billion in the heavy-chemical sectors
within such a short time span. Moreover, since the late 1970s domestic production and
exports of military hardware helped ease the foreign-exchange burden, though minimally.
Jurgen Bauer analyzed industrial diversification with-in the arms production-
relevant industries in his paper, "Arms Production in Developing Nations." Table 15
summarizes his research and is organized as follows. Nine International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) Categories (at the three-digit level) are entered column-
wise and data for Third World arms producers row-wise. Each cell entry denotes the
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number of ISIC sub-categories (at the six-digit level) in which a country was producing
items. For example, the three-digit ISIC code 351 (manufacture of industrial chemicals)
consists of 74 sub-categories (at the six-digit level) standing for 74 distinct chemical
products. Burma produced in 3 of those 74 sub-categories, Saudi Arabia in 2, and
Venezuela in 15. As shown in table 15, it is clear that the Korean defense industry has
contributed to the industrial diversification.
Table 15. Third World Arms Producers' production in ISIC categories, 1975-1984
351 352 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 Total
(74) (12) (32) (36) (15) (59) (27) (21) (6)
Saudi Arabia 2 1 3
Sudan 1 1 1 1 1 5
Zimbabwe 4 5 4 13
Singapore 3 3 2 3 2 13
North Korea 4 3 9 16
Nigeria 1 2 1 4 1 3 2 3 17
Malaysi 3 4 5 2 2 3 4 23
Pakistan 11 4 3 4 6 28
Burma 3 3 2 2 1 6 9 4 30
Thailand 9 2 5 3 1 2 5 4 31
Venezuala 15 1 10 6 1 4 37
Isreal 17 3 1 1 5 5 5 5 37
Peru 11 4 4 9 2 3 4 7 44
Iran 8 3 2 7 4 10 8 6 48
Egypt 20 2 14 4 2 4 9 8 63
South Africa 11 6 18 11 2 5 6 5 64
Indonesia 16 7 3 5 5 8 10 9 2 65
Argentina 18 5 17 10 7 4 7 68
Phillipines 18 4 9 6 4 9 11 6 1 68
Chile 21 6 10 8 3 6 11 4 69
Greece 26 7 10 14 7 21 15 9 109
Mexico 47 5 17 22 10 10 7 118
Portugal 41 8 16 14 3 27 18 14 133
India 55 8 13 22 3 17 10 12 2 142
Turkey 39 7 23 16 6 29 19 12 160
South Korea 54 8 21 18 6 28 15 11 4 165
Brazil 62 7 22 31 5 41 20 13 4 205
Yugoslavia 50 8 29 19 9 47 26 20 3 211
Spain 73 10 30 32 11 48 24 14 4 246
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Manufacture of industrial chemicals
352 Manufacture of other chemical products
371 Iron and steel basic industries
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies
384 Manufacture of transport equipment
385 Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and controlling
equipment not elsewhere classified, and of photographic and optical goods
As for the backward linkage effects, it is defmed as the ratio of output from arms
production-relevant industries to total defense industry purchases. Table 16 shows the
backward linkage effects of the Korean defense industry. According to Table 17, the
highest dependency of the defense industry on arms production-relevant firms belongs
to the communication sector. The general sector has the second highest dependency. The
gunnery and plastics sectors also have high dependency. On the other hand, the aerospace
and material sectors have low dependency on the defense industry. This means that the
backward linkage effects are low in some high technology sectors such as the aerospace
and materials, but high in others such as the communications. The overall dependency
of the Korean defense industry on domestic arms production-relevant industries is 0.16.
[Ref. 18:p. 81]
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Table 16. Dependency of Arms Production-relevant Industries on Defense Industry,
1987 (in millions won)
No. of Arms Output of Defense Dependency





General 354 18,494 36,855 0.50
Plastics 45 2,699 10,627 0.25
Vehicles 311 55,625 274,849 0.20
Gunnery 343 14,659 87,470 0.17
Ammunition 604 36,598 222,438 0.16
Missiles 55 1,163 10,017 0.12
Communication 136 2,126 29,068 0.67
Ships 266 2,981 55,727 0.05
Aerospace 7 1,440 29,288 0.05
Others 401 3,427 86,993 0.04
Materials 8 583 21,830 0.03
Electronics 59 102 20,962 0.00
Total 2,589 139,907 886,134 0.16
Source: Ja Song, Defense industry and its impacts on the civilian sector in Korea, 1990.
C. INCREASE IN CAPITAL STOCK
After the Korean industry mastered the labor-intensive industrial sectors during the
Second Plan period (1967-72), the Korean government began to reshape the industrial
structure in the direction of capital-and technology-intensive sectors, including heavy
machinery, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and electronics. As a result, the Korean
government began to invest on these sectors intensively. In particular, the "Special Law
on the Defense Industry" was legislated in 1973 in order to provide defense firms with
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financial assistance, tax incentives, cost accounting and special contracts. [Ref. 19:p.
290] Table 17 shows the composition of fixed investment in manufacturing by sector.
As mentioned before, the Korean National Assembly approved a defense tax
measure in 1975, increasing total tax revenue by about 10 percent to finance a second
five-year $5 billion modernization program.








Basic Metals 12.5 14.3 16.2
Chemicals8 30.7 17.4 22.5
Machinery,
electronics and
shipbuilding 11.6 16.8 25.4
Textile and
clothing 23.6 16.5 19.9
Other light
manufacturing 21.6 35.1 16.6
Note: The figures for the second, third, and fourth plans respectively are in 1965, 1970,
1975 prices.
Source: EPB, Second Plan; EPB, Third Plan; EPB, Fourth Plan.
a. Indicates cement and other glass, clay, and stone products.
The delayed first five-year plan ($1.5 billion, American financed) was to be
completed in 1977. The second five-year plan was largely financed by Korea, although
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the United States had promised support in the form of loans and other assistance. [Ref.
20:p. 135-136]
Table 1 8 presents the ratio of defense taxes to total tax revenue during the period
1976-1981. Special Law and defense taxation facilitated the physical investment in order
to develop the defense industry and to carry out the Forces Modernization Plans.
Table 18. Ratio of Defense Tax to Total Tax Revenues
Percent of Gross National Product
Item 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Internal Taxes 11.2 11.0 12.1 12.5 12.8 13.2
Direct Taxes 4.4 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.1
Indirect Taxes 6.4 6.7 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9
Others 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Customs Duties 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Monopoly Profits 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Local Taxes 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2
Defense Taxes 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
Total Tax Revenue 18.3 18.3 19.2 19.8 20.4 21.0
Ratio of Defense Tax 10.4 10.4 10.9 10.6 10.8 10.5
to Total Tax revenues
Gross National Product 13912.7 17806.6 24001.6 30801.8 36749.7 45528.1
(billions of won)
Note: All figures are in current prices.
Source: EPB, Fourth Plan.
The period from 1970 to 1978, during which massive defense industrialization took
place, was an era of capital abundance. The country's excellent economic performance
and good credit ratings attracted massive foreign capital inflows. At the same time,
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increased foreign earnings from exports provided the capital needed for defense
industrialization. Finally, the Middle East Construction booms facilitated the allocation
of scarce resources for the defense industry. Foreign earnings from the Korean
companies' construction of bridges, highway and harbor in Middle East were invested
in the defense sector.
Due to increases in gross fixed capital investment, investment in plant and
equipment has increased. Non-residential fixed investments per employee can be defined
as the capital stocks index. Table 19 presents the capital stocks index of defense
industries by sector. As shown in Table 19, fire and ammunition sectors have increasing
indexes during the second half of 1980s. This indicates that investment was significant
in conventional arms industries. But Korea should invest in communications and
aerospace sectors to develop technology-intensive industries.
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Table 19. Capital Stock Index of Korean Defense Industry by Sector (percent)
Year Fire Veh Vess Comm Aero Ammo
1985
1986 -7.6 15.8 3.1 7.2 26.1 1.1
1987 19.8 -2.9 102.5 6.9 38.6 29.2
1988 8.0 2.4 -6.5 22.9 -16.1 -12.0
1989 25.3 10.0 32.1 42.6 19.0 25.6
1990 43.1 27.7 -21.6 21.8 7.1 31.9
Annual
Average
Rate 17.7 10.8 21.9 20.3 14.9 15.2
Source: Korean Defense Industrial Complex, Analysis on Korean Defense Industry, 1991
.
This massive investment in the defense industry, particularly in 1976-1979, brought
macroeconomic problems such as waste, inefficiency and a record inflation rate, as
discussed before. Another negative result of military industrialization was Korea's
increased dependence on foreign credit. Of the investment funds required in 1978 (see
Table 7), over 75 percent was financed through foreign borrowing and foreign direct
investment in joint ventures. This heavy reliance on foreign credit coincided with higher
interest rates in the international capital market. The result was a drastic increase in
foreign debt, from $3.3 billion in 1975 to over $35 billion in the early 1980s. This
burgeoning debt burden-along with expanded payment for the purchase of parts,
machinery, and technologies essential to the defense industry—aggravated the balance of
payment position.
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An equally troublesome aspect of defense industrialization has been the increasing
tax burden. Since the National Defense Tax was introduced in 1975, its portion of
government revenue has continually expanded. For example, defense surtaxes constituted
only 3.8 percent of total revenues in 1975. They increased to an 1 1 -percent level in 1978
and to over 15 percent in 1982. Apart from the National Defense Tax, the government's
enforcement of voluntary contributions to a defense fund further aggravated private firms
and citizens.
Despite growing displeasure with the defense tax surcharge, the government
decided to extend it beyond 1985. Of course, the increasing burden of the defense tax
is a natural outcome of expanding defense expenditures. However, this was considered
necessary because of the North Korean military buildup and alliance commitments. Given
the growing portion of total military expenditure allocated for equipment acquisition and
R&D investment, the continuing tax burden is closely correlated with the subsidized
expansion of the defense industry.
A related negative outcome is the substitution effect between guns and butter. When
measured simply in terms of an aggregate correlation between military industrialization
and economic growth, there is a positive relationship. Thus, there appears to be no trade-
off between guns and butter. This is because the Korean economy grew at an average
annual rate of over 8 percent during the period 1976-82 (with the exception of 1980,
when it shrank 6.2 percent). These are the years during which defense industrialization
rapidly expended.
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Viewed in terms of allocation of public expenditure and the resulting pattern of
opportunity costs, however, there appears to be a substantial substitution effect. As table
20 indicates, defense expenditures drastically increased, from 25.9 percent of government
expenditure in 1972 (the first year of military industrialization) to 32.4 percent in 1976,
the year defense industrialization was expedited. While defense expenditure has continued
at over 30 percent since 1976, expenditures for social welfare and education have
remained constant or shown only incremental increases. Furthermore, public expenditure
on economic development has decreased. Despite the increase in capital stock, the
massive investment in the defense industry during 1976-79 brought on the
macroeconomic and foreign debt problems discussed before. Furthermore, the growth
in GNP may have been even greater if the defense burden had been lower during this
period. Government expenditures could have been focused on social or economic
investment instead of defense. Alternatively, government expenditures could have been
reduced, lowering the federal tax rate and further stimulating the economy.
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Table 20. Korean Public Expenditures by Appropriation Category, 1972-83
(percentage)
1972 1976 1979 1980 1982 1983 1983




education) 20.2 21.8 22.5 24.4 23.9 27.0 27.2
Economic
Development 16.6 24.2 20.4 18.9 18.6 17.5 17.4
Others 37.3 21.6 26.8 19.7 23.7 21.0 22.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Korean Economic Planning Board.
D. HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND CREATION OFEMPLOYMENT
Investment in physical plant is not the only prerequisite to military
industrialization. Investment in human capital is also required. Education and training
that improve the knowledge and skills of workers can vastly improve their productivity.
Modem defense forces provide training in technical and managerial skills which a
growing industrial economy requires. [Ref. 15:p. 135]
The educational impact of the military is especially noteworthy. In Republic of
Korea's early years, the military served as the largest primary educational institution for
young recruits without any formal schooling. Recruits are trained to fill the various
administrative and managerial posts with military institutions. The military also maintains
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a variety of training institutes to train officers and enlisted men in various areas.
According to one account, there were at one time 1 10 and 227 different courses dealing
with various fields of knowledge and skills respectively for officers and enlisted men.
[Ref. 21 :p. 19]
Korea has been remarkably successful in developing a stock of skills to meet the
changing needs of a rapid industrial development process. A diverse array of training
mechanisms—private and public, formal and informal, institutional and on-the-job—were
developed to meet growing needs for skills, particularly in manufacturing. [Ref.
22:p.l58]
At the beginning of the Korean defense industry, it lacked skilled workers and
technicians, particularly scientists and engineers. Korea has adopted measures to increase
its human capital. For example, the Korean Institute of Aeronautical Technology
increased its recruitment of foreign engineers (called reverse brain-drain) and boosted its
efforts to send Korean students overseas for rigorous training. A new facility was
initiated at Inchon, near Seoul, stressing training in structural engineering, aerodynamics
and avionics and other high-technology areas. The Gumho National Technical High
School was also established, providing scholarships and dormitories for the students who
were both in top 1 percent of their middle school and recommended by their principals.
After graduating, they were employed in the defense industry. These graduates are proud
of their jobs and highly motivated. Tables 21 and 22 present the investment on education
and enrollment in educational institutions.
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Note: All figures are in 1975 prices.
Source: EPB, Fourth Plan.
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Table 22. Enrollment in Educational Institutions, 1965-1975
1965 1975 Annual
Growth Rate
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Type of Institutions (thousands) (thousands) (percent)
Primary School 4917 25 5529 70 1.2 10.9
Middle School 418 333 1204 823 11.1 9.5
General High School 105 149 257 391 9.1 10.4
Vocational High School
37 26 226 249 19.9 25.4
Junior Technical
Vocational School
4 3 17 40 16.1 27.8
College, University,
other
35 99 70 169 7.1 5.5
Tertiary*
Others
12 84 8 150 -4.3 5.9
Total b
5528 720 7312 1892 2.8 10.1
Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Survey ofEducation, 1965; idem, Statistical Year
Book of Education, 1975.
a. Includes junior college, junior teachers' college, four-year colleges and universities,
graduate school, miscellaneous undergraduate institutions, and nurse training
institutions.
b. Excludes preprimary institutions.
Defense industrialization also contributed to the reverse brain-drain trend through
its aggressive recruitment strategy. In the initial phase of defense industrialization, one
critical task is to secure highly qualified personnel. Through various incentives, the
Korean government was able to recruit Korean-born scientists and engineers working in
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North America, Japan and Western Europe. The resulting pool of qualified professionals
not only helped the defense industry, but also the private sector and academic training
institutions.
In addition, the formation of the defense industry in the early 1970s created
employment opportunities. The defense industry has provided new jobs since 1970.
However, this has had negative spillover effects on the civilian sector considering the
opportunity cost of this labor. The demand for military manpower is a derived demand,
dependent on the amount of defense services required as well as on the availability of
alternative factors of production in the defense sector. [Ref. 23 :p. 141] There are
about 600,000 military personnel. This has contributed to reducing the unemployment
rate as well as creating demand for consumption goods by these personnel. In 1982, the
economically active population was recorded at 15 million and unemployment rate was
4.4 percent. If 600,000 military service jobs were added to the unemployed population,
the unemployment rate would increase from 4.4 to 8.0 percent. This is a short run effect.
Overtime this unemployment would depress wage rates and lead to further employment
in the non-military sector.
In 1983, the 3,240 billion won defense budget accounted for the 33 percent of the
government budget. However, 58 percent of defense budget, 1,980 billion won, was
returned to the civilian economy. [Ref. 24:p. 167] Table 23 shows the ratio of defense
industry employment to total employment. This ratio is 1.68 percent. From the national
economic point of view, this means that the defense industry has played a great role in
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creating employment opportunities. The highest proportion is in industrial chemicals,
9.19 percent. The aerospace sector is the second highest proportion of defense to total
employment at 8.39 percent. This means the defense industry is going to change from
conventional arms production to high technological weapons system production.
Table 23. Proportion of Defense Employment by Economic Activity, 1987
Industrial Base Total Defense Proportion
Employment Employment (%)
Industrial chemicals 41,625 3,822 9.18%
Aerospace 15,012 1,260 8.39
Basic metals 51,870 3,197 6.16
Non-metallic products 11,056 415 3.75
Fabricated metal products 203,085 7,320 3.60
Machinery 175,776 6,080 3.46
Transports/equipment 184,533 5,542 3.00
Electronic/electrical 440,148 5,094 1.16
machinery
Others 125,521 1,406 1.12
Other machinery 40,866 164 0.40
Coal products 12,281 38 0.31
Paper and paper products 56,022 129 0.23
Trade 135,502 304 0.22
Rubber products 87,630 122 0.14
Plastic products 88,203 75 0.09
Textile products 431,517 349 0.08
Total 2,107,252 35,317 1.68%
Source: Ministry of Labor, Labor Statistic Yearbook, 1989.
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Table 24 presents the proportion of defense industry employment by sector. As
shown in Table 24, one-third of total employment is in the ammunition and
communication sectors, one-fourth is in the basic materials, aerospace and firearms.
Table 25 shows the growth rate of defense industry employment by sector. The highest
average annual rate is in the vehicles sector. Employment in the aerospace sector has
grown above the average 10 percent in the second half of 1980s. On the other hand, the
ammunition and communication industries declined in the late 1980s. This indicates that
there are trends of increasing the employment in high-tech sectors. The decline in the
communications and ammunition sectors resulted from market saturation of conventional
arms.
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Table 24. Proportion of Defense Employment by Functional Sector, 1987.
Number of Total Defense
Firms Employment Employment %
Ammunition 7 32,886 11,361 34.55%
Communication 7 5,712 1,849 32.37
Basic Materials 9 14,533 4,013 27.61
Aerospace 3 14,850 3,718 25.04
Fire Power 9 28,605 6,667 23.31
Generals 10 8,232 1,469 17.84
Vehicles 9 34,871 3,408 9.77
Plastic/Chemical 7 10,429 922 8.84
Ship 4 39,066 2,615 6.69
Source: Ministry of Labor, Labor Statistic Yearbook, 1989.
Table 25. Growth Rate of Korean Defense Industry Employment by Sector
Year Fire Veh Vess Comm Aero Ammo
1985
1986 18.3 21.2 -3.6 80.2 5.3 9.5
1987 15.5 32.7 -16.8 -10.0 24.3 16.8
1988 1.1 19.3 0.3 7.4 17.4 4.3
1989 8.5 8.0 6.8 -0.6 8.1 -10.8
1990 -15.5 22.3 -7.9 -3.7 5.1 -9.8
Annual
Average 5.6 20.7 -4.2 14.7 12.1 2.0
Rate
Source: Korean Defense Industrial Complex, Analysis on Korean Defense Industry, 1991
.
E. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND SPILLOVERS
Technological spin-offs were another by-product of defense industrialization. The
extensive transfer of defense technology helped upgrade the state of the art in metallurgy,
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communications, and electronics, and has stimulated new research and development in
science and technology. Until the early 1970s, R&D investment belonged to the realm
of plans and ideas. Defense industrialization allowed cumulative, though limited,
investments in R&D. For the first time, this made it possible to undertake long-term as
well as basic research projects for the first time.
According to Min [Ref. 25], technological changes in the Korean defense
industry were calculated using the R. M Solow Model, (see Appendix B)
The final equation can be written below:
~A 7 T n ~K
— = —
-a — -p —AY L K
where a = (wage -lvalue added) times 100, = (interests, profits lvalue added) times
100, Y stands for output, L for labor and K for capital. The model assumes that a + /S
= 1. From this equation, the level of technical change A(t) can be calculated by:
A(t) = A(t-1) [ 1 + -MIL ] , t = 2, 3, ...
A(f-l)
Table 26 represents the technological advances in the Korean defense industry,
assuming A(t)= 1 in 1979. As shown in Table 26, the vehicle sector recorded the highest
index of technological advances. This sector relies on sophisticated technology.
Communications & electronics and aerospace & missile have also had sharp
advancements in technology since 1985. The sectors with the greatest absolute amount
of government-funded R&D have the highest growth rates.
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Table 26. Technical Change Index in Korean Defense Industry
Year Fire Veh Vess Comm Aero Ammo Total
1979 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1980 0.89 0.97 1.12 1.45 1.12 1.14 1.08
1981 1.71 2.41 1.43 1.30 1.24 1.52 1.37
1982 1.93 1.18 2.27 1.40 1.37 1.66 1.66
1983 2.25 1.37 3.07 1.47 1.63 1.80 1.67
1984 3.15 2.11 2.84 1.35 1.82 1.86 2.36
1985 2.25 2.37 2.42 1.66 2.06 1.96 2.36
1986 2.61 3.15 2.35 3.32 2.37 2.19 2.92
1987 3.47 4.18 2.05 3.05 3.19 2.82 3.75
1988 3.61 5.14 1.72 3.69 3.48 2.77 4.16
1989 4.13 5.90 1.80 4.42 3.97 2.56 4.65
1990 3.83 7.85 2.05 4.53 4.25 2.47 5.29
Annual
Average
Rate 16.6 28.5 8.9 17.9 14.3 9.2 17.1
Source: Chung, Koog I., Defense R&D and Technical Advances , 1991.
Technological advancement makes it possible to generate additional output with the
same amount of resources. Technological advancement is brought about by capital
formation and research investment. Modern technological breakthroughs are generally
the results of systematic investments in research and development. Therefore, the
Ministry of Defense set up a plan to increase the military R&D investment to 5 percent
of the defense budget by the year 2000. Table 27 shows the increasing trends in the
military R&D investment in the late 1980s.
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* 1970-1980; Average ratio: 2.3 percent
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Defense Statistic Yearbook, 1990.
Assuming that there is a positive correlation between military R&D investment and
the technical change index, we get the following the regression equation:




where A(t) is the technical advancement in year t, and RDDl is Defense R&D investment
in year t.
The results of the regression equation are shown in Table 28. Theses results show
that defense R&D has a positive effect on technical advancement. In terms of Table 28,
the coefficients of the conventional sectors such as fire, vehicles and vessels are larger
than those of the aerospace and communications sector. This means that defense R&D
had large impact on technological change in fire, vehicles and vessels than in aerospace
and communication. But Korea should funnel investment in R&D for high technological
sectors in order to develop the aerospace and electronic industries. Most importantly, the
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technological advancement in sectors where military R&D was invested increased the
growth rate of GNP.
Table 28. Relationship between Defense R&D and Technical Change Index in Korea
Sector 8o a. R2
Fire 0.573 2.73 0.776
Vehicles 0.606 4.81 0.788
Vessles 0.825 5.40 0.905
Communication 1.037 0.64 0.576
Aerospace 0.630 0.44 0.885
Ammunition 0.783 1.69 0.979
Total 0.593 1.81 0.948
Source: Chung, Koog I., Defense R&D and Technical Advances, 1991.
F. INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE
South Korea military exports grew fast since their inception in 1975, reportedly
rising from $ 5 million in 1975 to a peak of $975 million in 1982 (See Table 29). Since
then, military export revenues have reportedly averaged $250 million annually. There is
a concerted government-supported effort to expand sales. [Ref. 15:p. 225]
The achievement of self-sufficiency in conventional weapon systems, however, was
followed by widely anticipated negative consequences: market saturation and resultant
underutilization of defense-production capacity. To avoid these consequences of market
saturation, Korea has to actively export military hardware.
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Table 29. Major Weapon Exporters in the Third World
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total %
Isreal 50 140 60 120 260 140 260 360 1,390 9.62
China 180 140 110 160 130 250 370 1,000 2,340 16.19
S. Korea 5 5 110 70 190 250 250 400 1,280 8.86
Saudi Arabia 10 10 20 90 525 655 4.53
Brazil 30 80 20 110 120 150 150 625 1,258 8.89
N. Korea 10 80 20 90 90 190 470 480 1,430 9.89
Cuba 30 120 10 10 20 190 1.31
Egypt 50 90 10 30 290 470 3.25
Iran 50 30 30 20 130 0.90
Libya 5 20 10 90 5 60 290 480 3.32
Turkey 5 10 10 10 150 150 160 495 3.42
Others 245 275 375 405 355 565 795 1,285 4,310 29.82
Total 620 890 815 1105 1345 1700 3070 4910 14455 100.0
Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Exprnditure and Arms
Transfer 1972-1982, (Washington, D.C.:ACDA,1984), pp. 53-94.
As Table 29 demonstrates, the value of Korean military exports was minimal before
1979. At that time, most military exports were composed of uniforms and other nonlethal
equipment. Since 1979, however, Korea has not only increased the dollar value of its
military exports, but also shifted its export items from soft goods to conventional weapon
systems. It is now one of the most competitive exporters of infantry munitions, weapons
and light naval vessels (see Table 30). As a result, from 1975 to 1982, Korea emerged
as the fifth largest exporter in the Third World (People's Republic of China included)
with the total trade value of $1.28 billion (8.86 percent of the Third World's total).
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Table 30. Exports of Defense Industry by Function (In million won)
Year Fire Ammo Veh Comm Vess Aero Other Total
1975 200 109 309
1976 800 800
1977 1726 1731 3457
1978 416 3473 12764 44 16697
1979 395 7222 14875 115 22607
1980 4363 28229 18315 4039 1188 56134
1981 6325 28331 6313 18 42839 6939 4039 94804
1982 7373 34567 6469 34 32848 7796 11103 100190
1983 12931 84933 29315 603 57154 9158 14094 280080
1984 8222 21380 2882 480 20142 9261 2625 64992
1985 5866 28360 15673 762 9138 12845 2099 74743
1986 7647 28628 9865 780 6258 12582 2633 68363
1987 24278 27317 7510 502 21574 15197 6635 103013
1988 22723 23592 13839 106 23495 31430 3717 118902
1989 14464 21120 5193 359 19404 44613 1530 106683
Source: KIDA, Analysis on Defense R&D and Defense Industry in Korea, 1990.
Table 31 shows the regional distribution of Korean military exports during 1983-
84. The largest market was the Middle East ($140 million), followed by the Western
hemisphere, particularly Latin America. The Asian region was the third largest importer
of Korean military hardware ($110 million), while Europe and Africa were insignificant
markets.
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Source: Korean Ministry of National Defense.
Notes: Figures in this table indicate deliveries of hardware excluding software.
One interesting trend in Korean military exports has been the relatively high
fluctuation by year. Tables 29 and 30 indicate that while exports grew rapidly from 1978
to 1982, there has been a sharp downturn since 1983. Export volume in 1984 returned
to the level of 1977, although the variety and volume of hardware products has
substantially increased. Korean military exports expanded due to surplus capacity, price
competitiveness, the diffusion of regional conflicts, and the growing demand for
conventional arms. As shall be discussed, however, growing pressure from the United
States to restrict Korean sales to other nations (i.e., third-country arms sales) as well as
increased competition from other Third World arms exporters have undermined Korea's
military export efforts.
As for arms imports, the major rationale for domestic arms production is that it
should substitute for arms imports. The ratio of arms imports to domestic arms
production measures this substitution. Table 32 shows the ratio of arms imports to
83
domestic arms production. Although arms imports are increasing year by year, the ratio
of arms imports to total imports and the ratio of arms imports to domestic arms
production is decreasing. This means that the defense industry saved foreign exchange
by producing weapons domestically.
Table 32. Arms Import and Domestic Arms Production (in million dollars)
Year Import Total % Production %
(A) Import (A) (A/B) (C) (A/C)
1970 150 1984 7.5
1971 220 2394 9.1
1972 350 2522 13.8
1973 170 4240 4.0
1974 80 6582 1.1
1975 190 7274 2.6 34.7 547
1976 340 8774 3.8 91.3 372
1977 300 10811 2.7 119.0 252
1978 525 14772 3.5 287.8 182
1979 525 20339 2.5 420.0 125
1980 480 22290 2.2 497.2 96.5
1981 390 26130 1.5 630.4 61.9
1982 430 24150 1.8 622.3 69.1
1983 390 26190 1.5 802.0 38.5
1984 380 30630 1.2 728.5 52.5
1985 430 31140 1.4 830.6 51.8
1986 550 31580 1.7 1222.6 44.9
1987 625 41020 1.5 1417.6 44.0
1988 600 51810 1.2 2023.2 29.7
Source: U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures andArms Transfers, Several editions.
International trade in arms is very sensitive to international relationships. The
Korean defense industrialization has depended on the United States from the beginning
84
in the forms of technical data packages, manufacturing licenses, and coproduction
schemes. Based on two legal constructs (the United States Arms Export Control Act and
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the items and destination of Korean
military exports must be approved by the United States in advance. This 3CS (third-
country sales) regulation is dealing a serve blow to Korea's military hardware exports.
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V. THE FUTURE OF KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
A. THE DISPARITY IN MILITARY STRENGTHS OF SOUTH AND NORTH
The tumultuous changes in the socialist nations, including the Soviet Union, have
set off a wave of drastic changes in the world's security environment. The solidifying
peace in Europe tends to heighten the strategic importance of Northeast Asia in the
world. On the Korean peninsula, military tension continues unabated principally because
of Pyongyang's unchanging anachronistic bid for the forceful communization of the
South. North Korea leaves no doubt about its intention to communize the whole Korean
peninsula. Persistent plots to instigate a procommunist revolution in the South together
with a war-preparation campaign for another full-scale war on the Korean peninsula are
in line with this policy goal. The South-North Korean relationship may take a turn for
the better in the future, but there is an equally high likelihood that the relationship will
undergo a very dangerous turn-depending on how the North Korean leadership reacts
to external changes and manages internal demands for reform.
Safeguarding national security requires an adequate military capability. Table 33
shows the disparity in military strength between South and North Korea. The present
imbalance of military strength between the two Koreas stems principally from the fact
that the South did not start its force improvement program until 1974, twelve years later
than North. The North Korean force reinforcement program commenced as early as
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1962. (See Table 34.) Since then, North Korea has spent from twenty to twenty-four
percent of its GNP on defense. South Korea's military spending was limited to five
percent of GNP. Furthermore, North Korea could funnel forty-eight percent of its
military budget into force buildup, whereas the South has been able to spend only twenty
to forty percent of its defense budget for this purpose. In the future, South Korea's GNP
is expected to grow to more than ten times that of the North. As Figure 5 illustrates,
South Korea overtook the North in defense outlay in 1976. South Korea spent 3.69
billion dollars at the 1989 fixed price in comparison with the 3. 16 billion dollars expend
by the North in the same year.
Table 33. Military Disparity between South and North Korea in 1990






























































Source: ROK MND, Defense White Paper, 1991-1992
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Table 34. Ratio of Military Expenditures against GNP
Classification North Korea South Korea
Beginning year of Force
buildup
1962 1974
Defense spending 20 to 24 percent of GNP 5 percent of GNP
Force buildup
investment ratio
48 percent of the military
outlay
20 to 40 percent of the
military outlay
Source: ROK MND, Defense Wltite Paper, 1991-1992
Assuming that the North will continue spending twenty to twenty-four percent of
its GNP on defense, with forty-eight percent going to force buildup, and that the South
will maintain its defense spending at five percent of GNP with thirty-eight percent
invested in force buildup, South Korea will outstrip the North in terms of cumulative
investment in force buildup beginning in the mid-1990s.
If these assumptions hold, the military imbalance between the Koreas will soon be
rectified. However, in view of the differences in decision-making and the weapon-
acquisition processes between socialist and capitalist countries, it is not likely to be until
the early 2000s that an overall military balance will be achieved on the Korean peninsula.
Since the 1960s, South Korea has given top priority to economic development
rather than to military buildup. In contrast, North Korea's top policy priority has always
been building military strength in preparation for another war against the South. In 1988,
South Korea's defense spending fell below five percent of its GNP. This level of military
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spending relative to GNP is not much more than half that of other countries under
military confrontation, as is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 5. Military Spending Trends of South and North Korea
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Source: ROK MND, Defense White Paper, 1991-1992
In 1989, as is shown in Table 35, South Korea's defense budget was equivalent to
4.99 percent of the GNP and 32.4 percent of the government budget. The FY 1990
defense budget stands at 6,887.3 billion Won (approximately $9 billion). When excluding
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Source : US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988
O <U
the costs of conscription administration and maintenance of combat and maritime police,
which amount to 249.5 billion Won, the defense budget accounts for 4.35 percent of
GNP and 29.3 percent of the government budget.
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Table 35. South Korean Defense Spending against GNP, 1990 (percent)
















31.2 31.2 31.6 32.8 32.4 30.4
Source: ROK MND, Defense White Paper, 1991-1992
According to North Korea's official announcements, the proportion of its defense
spending in the government budget has continued to fall from fourteen percent in 1986
to 13.2 percent in 1987, 12.2 percent in 1988 and twelve percent in 1989. When the size
of the North Korean armed forces and the recent purchase of advanced weapon systems
are taken into account, however, these figure are not reliable. Much of it is concealed
under the headings of "people's economic expenditures" and socio-cultural expenditures.
North Korea's real defense budget is believed to amount to 30 percent of the government
budget. Expressed in dollars, North Korea's FY 1990 defense budget reached 5.28
billion dollars, whereas that of the South amounted to 8.98 billion dollars, a ratio of one
to 1.7. (See Table 36.)
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* There is no official information available for the boxes left empty in the above table.
In the case of defense expenditure, it amounts to $1,763.9 million according to the
following calculation. 33,382,940,000 x 0.12 /2.23 = $1,763,900,000.
* The International Institute for Strategic Studies (HSS) estimates North Korea's defense
spending of FY 1989 at 4,170 million dollars. The comparable estimate given by South
Korean experts on North Korea is 4.5 billion dollars.
Source: ROK MND, Defense White Paper, 1991-1992
In sum, South Korea began outstripping the North in terms of annual defense
spending in 1976. However, its cumulative defense investment amounts to only seventy -
one percent of North Korea's. As mentioned before, it is anticipated that this disparity
will not be resolved until the mid-1990s.
North Korea has an advantage over the South in terms of conditions for military
buildup. North Korea saves from uncompensated land expropriation and forced labor
mobilization. Its salary and food expenses for soldiers amount to only half of those borne
92
by the South. In addition, it benefits from cheap electricity and other utility cost. North
Korea is also able to purchase military hardware more cheaply than the South because
the overall weapon and part prices in the communist world are lower than those in the
free world. In contrast, South Korea has to acquire military equipment at much higher
prices, not only from foreign suppliers but also from local defense industries in order to
guarantee them a decent profit.
From the military point of view, the Korean Defense Industrialization has
contributed to military modernization and force improvements. Indeed, the ambitious
buildup of the defense industry has given a sense of confidence and a feeling of security
to the Korean people. South Koreans have been obsessed with military inferiority vis-a-
vis North Korea during the past three decades. Furthermore, the widened variety and
increased production capacity of defense industry have drastically improved the South
Korean defense forces' s combat capability. For example, until the mid-1970s the majority
of Korean soldiers used M-l or Calvin rifles manufactured during World War II or the
Korean War. The M-l 6 rifle was a rare item, allocated to elite divisions such as special
combat forces. Today, all soldiers and even reserve forces use the M-l 6 because it is
domestically produced. Improvement has been realized in armored, artillery, and infantry
units. Their units had primarily depended on outdated weapons from World War n and
the Korean War. Furthermore, domestic production and increased availability of military
helicopters enhanced the Korean defense force's maneuverability in antiguerrilla
operations. In addition to this equipment improvement, the existence of the relatively
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diversified defense industry contributed to peacetime industrial readiness in logistics
supply.
B. THE FUTURE OF KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
In the past decades, the Korean economic development strategy has been
traditionally characterized by "growth first and redistribution later." Emphasis on growth
substantially constrained social welfare services. Although the emphasis has shifted from
economic growth to social development since late 1970, resource allocation for social
development has been limited due to the defense burden. Sagging progress in the
provision of social welfare to meet rising expectations can drastically undermine the
regime's legitimacy and political stability. This is particularly true because ruling regimes
are exhausting their ability to make political hay of "national security" issues. Though
acutely aware of their vulnerability, the Korean people, particularly the youth, no longer
accept national security as deus ex machina. To them, equality and welfare should not
be sacrificed in the name of security.
The trade-offs between economic growth and defense industrialization in Korea
seemed equally apparent. Considering the threat from North Korea, the Korean defense
industry is necessary to ensure national security. Also the Korean defense industry should
contribute to improving national welfare. For this purpose, this thesis will suggest some
ideas about the future of the Korean defense industry.
First, the Korean defense industry needs better coordination in defense-industrial
policy. Rapid military industrialization was initiated without due attention to technical
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engineering, financial capacities, and medium and long term industrial consequences. The
result was excess capacity, duplication of facilities and licenses and a fragile and non-
competitive corporate structure. This eventually threatened the very survival of the
defense industry. In the past, decisions involving the defense industry belonged
exclusively to the Blue House and the ADD. But the defense industry is closely related
with other Ministries, agencies and the civilian industry. Defense-industrial policy should
be better coordinated among the Ministry of National Defense, the Economic Planning
Board, the Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Communications, Science and
Technology, Energy and Resources, the Agency For National Security Planning, civilian
research agencies and private businesses related to the defense industry. This
coordination would enable the Korean defense industry to eliminate duplication and
excess capacity.
Second, competition is required in the Korean Defense market. The significant
political implication of Korean defense industrialization is a military-industrial complex.
The military-industrial complex in Korea played a strong role in shaping the nature of
the defense establishment. In Korea, defense contractors are not differentiated by their
specialty and capability. Big business conglomerates virtually dominate the defense
industry. As Table 37 illustrates, seven of the top ten Korean business conglomerates,
whose annual gross sales account for over 40 percent of GNP, are actively engaged in
the defense industry. In fact, they account for the majority of the defense industry. Other
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defense contractors are small-scale parts manufacturers except for a few firms such as
KIA, Poong San Metal, and Tong IL Industry.
Table 37. Leading Korean Businesses: Finances and Defense Production Lines
Rank Company 1984 Gross Debt/Equity Bank Defense
Sales (in won Ratio (%) Credit Production Line
billion) (%)
1 Sam Sung 7,851 656 4.11 Jet engine




7,717 456 2.97 grenades; comm;
Vulcan missile
4 Daewoo 5,535 442 6.09 106mm rifle; Patrol
boats; M-16 rifle;
M202 rocket
5 Sun-Kyung 5,273 485 2.56 N.A.
6 Snagyong 2,452 433 3.35 Tank engine
7 Korea
Explosive
2,099 320 1.35 Explosives
8 Kukje 1,791 914 2.14 N.A.
9 Hanjin 1,732 422 1.47 Helicopters; F-5E/F
10 Hyosung 1,719 784 1.23 N.A.
18 KIA 719 335 N.A. Vechiles
37 Poong San
Metal
309 1,129 N.A. Ammunition; Small
arms
N.A. means not available.
Rank is by gross sales in 1984.
Source: Hankuk Ilbo, May 11,1985, p. 10
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The fusion of the defense and commercial industries in the hands of these big
conglomerates resulted from the political process. There is no competition in defense
contracts. Defense firms should be designated by their specialty and capability based on
the competitive market. No competition in defense market may be the reason for low
productivity in the Korean defense industry.
The government should attempt to reorganize the overall structure of the defense
industries so they can be more productive. In addition, the government should privatize
the defense industry as appropriate, to improve productivity.
Third, defense R&D investment should increase. As discussed earlier, technical
advances depend on R&D investment. Compared to other countries, Korea has invested
a small proportion of its defense budget on defense R&D (e.g., U.S. (4.3 percent) and
Japan (5.4 percent)). Defense R&D was also oriented to develop conventional arms. Now
it is time to review and determine the level of the defense technology accumulated since
the early 1970s. The direction of defense technology development should be re-
established based on the current technological trends that have applications in the civilian
sector (e.g., semiconductors, computers and communications, information industry, new
materials, aerospace, and bio-engineering). Because productivity growth is positively
related to long-term R&D projects, defense R&D should be directed toward longer term
basic research.
Fourth, Korea should make an effort to diversify sources of weapon technology and
markets in order to reduce its heavy reliance on the United States. Because of this
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dependence, the Korean defense industry has limited maneuverability and a subtle form
of vulnerability. Korea had no choice in defense contracts with the United States.
Finally, the 3CS (third-country sales) regulation is another problem. Despite the
limited demand for its products, the Korean defense industry requires highly-sophisticated
technology and heavy investment. To overcome the limited domestic demand and the
defense budget constraints, the Korean defense industry has no alternative but to turn to
overseas market. To acquire highly-sophisticated weapons technology and to increase
exports, the Korean defense industry should seek agreements on defense industry
cooperation, quality assurance, and cooperative exchanges with foreign nations, including
advanced western countries and the developing countries of the Third World.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The historical evolution of the ROK Defense industry has been mainly influenced
by continuing tensions between South and North Korea, U.S. alliance policy in Northeast
Asia, South Korea's domestic economic and technological factors, and economic interests
of U.S. defense industries. Among these factors, military confrontation between South
and North Korea will continue to be one of the most important factors influencing the
expansion of the ROK defense industry in the near future.
The Korean defense industry was dependent upon the parallel development of its
economy and technology. Korean defense industrialization has entailed both costs and
benefits. Rapid defense industrialization brought negative effects on economy, including
macroeconomic constraints (overcapacity, inflation, increasing tax burden, and foreign
debts), formation of military-industry complex, sectoral trade-offs, and a substitution
effect between guns and butter. But the Korean defense industry also had positive effects
on economy, including GNP growth, physical and human capital formation, technical
spillovers and arms import substitution. It is unlikely that these goals would have
received as much attention without the significant security threats from North Korea over
the past two decades.
The justification for defense industry should come from national security rationales.
Investments in defense are not completely wasted as far as economic benefits are
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concerned. Thus, defense is not as much of a burden on the economy as many suggest.
The Korean defense industry has contributed to economic growth as well as national
security. However, economic goals could be achieved more effectively through policies
designed for economic purposes. National defense expenditures should not be supported
based on their economic side effects. National defense expenditures have an opportunity
cost in terms of forgone private or public sector economic opportunities. A final




FEDER AND RAM MODEL IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The economy is considered to have two sectors - civilian and defense. The defense
sector is assumed to indirectly influence the civilian sector. The civilian sector may be
stimulated due to positive spillovers from the defense sector, such as technological
advance. In addition, skilled labor is also available due to government spending on
defense sector research and training. Without the defense sector, the civilian sector would
bear the cost of training this labor. Also, the civilian sector may be retarded because of
negative spillovers, including labor shortages in some areas, lack of investment funds and
paucity of research scientists. All of these influences are outside the control of the
civilian sector and are best described in general as external effects.
Considering these interactions, an aggregate production model of the economy is
constructed which includes both the externality and productivity effects of defense
spending. The basic two sector production model described here is derived from the
article "Defense spending and Economic growth" written by H.SONMEZ ATESOGLU
and MICHAEL J. MUEUER and "Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Less
Developed Countries" written by BASUDEB BISWAS and RATI RAM. Defense
spending is used as an index or measure of defense industry externality so it is included
in the production function of the civilian sector.
The aggregate production function for each sector is:
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where D is defense output, C is the civilian output and the subscripts represent the two
sectors. Specifically Ld and Lc are productive labor inputs employed in the defense and
civilian sectors, and Kd and Kc are capital stocks in the defense and the civilian sectors.
In this economy, aggregate output is:
Q = D + C, (3)
where Q is real output, and other variables are as defined above. The total inputs are:
L - Ld + Lc , (4)
K = Kd + ATC , (5)
where L and K are the total labor and capital stocks in the economy.
Here the marginal productivities of the factors of production—labor and capital-in
the defense sector may not be the same as they are in the civilian sector. Allowance is
made for this by assuming that the marginal productivity of factors used in the defense







where the D/s and C,'s are the marginal products of labor and capital in the two sectors.
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The implicit assumption that the productivity differential is the same for labor and
capital is a simplification. It would be possible to develop a simultaneous equations
model, based on the two sectoral production functions, taking into account separate
productivity differentials and cross externality effects, but it could not readily be
estimated due to data limitations. Separate data would be needed for the capital stock and
labor employed in the defence sector and for that used in the civilian sector.
Defence production is not completely separate physically from civilian production
because a large portion of defence supplies and equipment is produced by civilian firms
on contracts with the military. Thus, part of what is measured as civilian capital and
labor is used for defence purposes. The distinction between the defence and civilian
sectors is a theoretical difference. Empirically, civilian output or spending is just the
difference between real output and defence spending, C = Q - D, because data is only
available for D and Q. One of these variables must be eliminated for estimation purposes.
Thus, it is necessary to develop single equation models which eliminate variables that are
based on this theoretical distinction, i.e., C, Kd , Ld , Kc , and Lc — for which data is not
readily available. This is accomplished below.
Taking the total differential of Q = D + C using equations (1) and (2) gives:
dQ = D,dLd + DkdKd + C,dLc + CkdKc + CDdD
Eliminating D
t




(dKd + dKc) + CfidLd + </Lf) + 6(C^ + C^) + C/D.
From equations (4) and (5), dL = dLd + dLc and dK = d£^ + dKc . Also, since C, =
D/(l + 6) and Q = DJ{\ + 5), the last term in parentheses is equal to {1/(1 + 6)} dD.
Making the substitutions gives:
dQ = CkdK + C^L + (6/(1 + b))dD + C/Z), (6)
where Q and Ck are the marginal productivities of labor and capital in the civilian sector
and Cd is the externality effect of defence output on the civilian sector. If Cd > and/or
5 > 0, increased defense output will imply a higher rate of growth of total output Q.
Dividing each side of equation (6) by Q, it can be written in terms of growth rates
as:
(7)
dQIQ - Ck(I/Q) C{dL/L)(L/Q) * [6/(1 + 6) + Cd](dD/D)(DlQ),
where / = dK, i.e. aggregate real investment spending in the economy, /, is used as a
proxy for the change in the capital stock. Values for Ck , Ch and (5/(1 + 5) + Cd) are
empirical parameters to be estimated.
In general, a form such as dX/X is the relative growth rate of variable X over the
period in question. Since the purpose of the paper is to determine the effect of changes
in defence spending on economic growth of the economy, it is appropriate to express the
independent variables, as well as the dependent variable, in terms of growth rates. Thus,
the last two terms include dL/L and dD/D, and the estimation uses relative growth rates
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as data. It is not useful to express the first term as a relative growth rate because data
is not readily available for capital stock.
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APPENDIX B
ROBERT M. SOLOW MODEL (1957)
In the 1950's, some U.S economists tried to use empirical data to determine how
much technological change occurred. Among them, Robert M. Solow suggested a model
and calculated technological changes in his paper, "Technical change and the aggregate
production function." (Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 39, 312-320, 1937)
He used the aggregate production function as below:




where K stands for capital and L for labor.
Differentiating with respect to time and denoting the derivatives by putting a line
over variable, hence dQ/dt = Q, we have
—
- dF— dF-Q = A F( KtX, ) + A—K + A—L .1
' dK dL






4 dF~K . BFT
— = + A + A .
Q Q dK Q dL Q
Now we add the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products:
106
BQ dF r_ dQ .dF w
dK ' dK p ' dL dL p
In Solow's notation, the shares of capital and labor are denoted respectively by wK
= rK/pQ and wL = wL/pQ. With this assumption the preceding equation becomes
~Q
~A ~K T
— = — + uv— + w.— .Q A K K L L
Assuming constant returns to scale gives wL + wK = 1 by Euler's theorem and we
can convert to per capita variables q = Q/L and k = K/L. The proportionate rates of
change of the per capita variables are expressed in terms of the proportionate rates of
change of the total volume variables as follows
-
q = Q _ Q i, i m K . JL z,
L L 2 L L 1
and so
q Q _ L k K L
q Q V k K L
Substituting in, and using wL = 1 - u^,we have
q A k




Approximating the continuous time derivatives by first differences in annual data,
and given data on output per man-hour, capital per man- hour and the share of capital,
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the technical change index A(t)/A(t-1) can be calculated year by year from this relation.
The results of this calculation then permit a series for A(t) to be constructed by assuming
an arbitrary initial value A(l) = l and repeatedly using the relation,
A(t) =A(t-l)[l +
-£^-1, f=2, 3,...
The resulting series has a strong upward trend; the average rate of technical
progress in the U.S. over the period 1909-1949 was 1.5% per annum.
Having obtained an estimate of how much the production function was shifting,
Solow then asked how much of the increase in output per man-hour during the forty
years was due to technical change, and how much was due to the increase in k. An idea
of the fixed function corrected for technical progress can be obtained by dividing q(t) by
A(t). This estimates what would have occurred without technical change, that is the
increase in output per man-hour attributable to the increase in capital. Solow found that
technical change over the sample period accounted for 90 % of the improvement in output
per man-hour and the growth of capital the remaining 10%. As Solow acknowledged, his
measure is a catch-all, incorporating any kind of shift in the production function—
"slowdowns, speedups, improvements in the education of the labor force" (an embodied
technical change) all appear as "technical change." A further difficulty with an aggregate
measure such as this is that it ignores changes in the composition of output. For example,
if the economy utilizes more intensively sectors which enjoy comparative advantages, but
there is no technical progress, the overall productivity measure will still increase.
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